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I. INTRODUCTION
Competition laws worldwide have been developing at a rapid pace
for the past several decades, spurred by technical assistance and
recommendations from a diverse collection of organizations including
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),'
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD),2
I. See generally Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://
www.oecd.org (last visited Sept. 24, 2009). The OECD, founded in 1961, describes itself as a
membership organization of thirty nations dedicated to collecting economic information and
supporting economic growth, employment, improved living standards, trade, and development.
Id. (follow "About OECD" hyperlink). With respect to antitrust principles, the organization
states:
Well-designed competition law, effective law enforcement and competition-based
economic reform promote increased efficiency, economic growth and employment for
the benefit of all. OECD work on competition law and policy actively encourages
decision-makers in government to tackle anti-competitive practices and regulations and
promotes markct-oriented reform throughout the world.
Id (follow "By topic" hyperlink; then follow "Competition" hyperlink).
2. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) includes
research and technical assistance in the fields of competition and consumer protection in its
programs of economic development. See generally U.N. Conference of Trade & Dev,
Competition Law and Policy, http://www.unctad.org (last visited Sept. 17, 2009). The antitrust
activities include:
UNCTAD provides competition authorities from developing countries and
economies in transition with a development-focused intergovernmental forum for
addressing practical competition law and policy issues.
Every year, UNCTAD hosts the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on
Competition Law and Policy for consultations on competition issues of common
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the International Competition Network (ICN),3 and the World Trade
Organization (WTO).4 Following this lead, a large and growing number
of jurisdictions, recently joined by The People's Republic of China
(PRC),5 have chosen to adopt their own antitrust laws and institute
enforcement regimes. Antitrust law, also referred to as competition law
(European Union) and antimonopoly law (China), comprises a number of
distinct types of trade restraints. These include: horizontal agreements,6
defined to cover both hard core cartels7 and other pro-competitive price
concern to member States and informal exchange of experiences and best practices,
including a Voluntary Peer Review of Competition Law and Policy.
UNCTAD is also engaged in technical cooperation with countries seeking
capacity-building and technical assistance in formulating and/or effectively enforcing
their competition law.
UNCTAD has developed a Voluntary Peer Review mechanism as part of its
technical cooperation activities.
UNCTAD is a depository of international competition legislations, the Model
Law on Competition and the United Nations Set of Principles on Competition.
Id. (follow "Programmes" hyperlink; then select "Competition and Consumer Policies"
hyperlink).
3. Int'l Competition Network (ICN), http://www.intemationalcompetitionnetwork.org
(last visited Sept. 17, 2009).
4. World Trade Org. [WTO], Interaction Between Trade and Competition Policy, http://
www.wto.org/English/ltratop-e/comp-e/comp-e.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2009). The World
Trade Organization first raised competition policy in 1996 in connection with the Singapore
Ministerial Conference and established a working group to assess the relationship of trade and
competition policy. The working group considered issues including capacity building support for
developing countries' competition enforcement, fundamental competition principles, and
international cooperation. Work proceeded until the Cancun Ministerial Conference (2003),
when no consensus was reached on issues including competition, and the General Council
decided in the July 2004 Package (adopted August 1, 2004) that with respect to the
[rielationship between Trade and Investment, Interaction between Trade and
Competition Policy and Transparency in Government Procurement: the Council agrees
that these issues, mentioned in the Doha Ministerial Declaration in paragraphs 20-22,
23-25 and 26 respectively, will not form part of the Work Programme set out in that
Declaration and therefore no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take
place within the WTO during the Doha Round.
WTO Gen. Council, WT/L/579, § 1(g) (Aug. 1, 2004), available at http://www.wto.org/English/
tratop e/dda e/draftjtext.gc..dg_3 ljulyO4_e.htm.
5. China passed the Anti-Monopoly Law (AIL), the first comprehensive antitrust law
of general application, on August 31, 2007, with an effective date of August 1, 2008. Anti-
Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. of the Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 30, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDNG Comm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 68 (PR.C.), available
at http://www.fdi.gov.cn.pub/FDIEN/Laws/GgeneraLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P0200710
12533593599575.pdf.
6. U.S. Dep't of Justice & the Fed. Trade Comm'n, Horizontal Merger Guidelines
(issued Apr. 2, 1992, revised Apr. 8, 1997) [hereinafter U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger
Guidelines], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf (discussing antitrust
analysis of horizontal agreements).
7. See, e.g., Scott D. Hammond, Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the
Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program (Mar. 26, 2008) (unpublished presentation at
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and nonprice cooperation agreements;8 vertical price-related distribution
restraints, including resale price maintenance,9 nonprice restraints,"° and
tying arrangements;" monopolization;' 2 and mergers.'3
Among these antitrust issues are areas characterized by worldwide,
general consensus, as well as others that are marked by divergent views
in different jurisdictions. For example, while there is widespread
agreement that horizontal cartels are harmful and should be prohibited,"
there is less agreement on the precise contours of where the outside
boundaries lie. For instance, there is disagreement as to whether the
appropriate enforcement mechanism should comprise strictly
governmental agency or also provide private rights of action, and whether
criminal or civil remedies are appropriate. There is far less consensus
with respect to modem vertical restraints and distribution rules.'5
Monopolization, or abuse of a dominant position, represents another
substantive area where there is general agreement at the margins but
some divergence about other significant but not central issues, that is,
whether and under what circumstances competition law can deal with
the 56th Annual Spring Meeting, ABA Section of Antitrust Law), available at http://www.usdoj.
gov/atr/public/speeches/232716.pdf. Hard core cartels are frequently prosecuted criminally by
jurisdictions that have criminal enforcement power including the United States. See id at 1.
Eleven criminal defendants were fined $100 million or more between 1996 and 2007, and more
than 150 individuals since 2000 have completed or are in the process of serving terms of
imprisonment in connection with criminal antitrust prosecutions. Id at 5, 12.
8. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1979);
Cal. Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 759-62 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 891-94
(2007).
10. See, e.g., Cont'l TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,42-43 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9-11 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Verizon Comm'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398,415-16 (2004).
13. See, e.g., FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 E3d 708, 718 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Staples,
Inc., 970 E Supp. 1066, 1070 (D.D.C. 1997).
14. See., e.g., WORKING GROUP ON CARTELS, INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK, DEFINING
HARD CORE CARTEL CONDUCT: EFFECTIVE INSTITUTIONS, EFFECTIVE PENALTIES 9-16 (2005),
available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/media/library/conference 4th
bonn_2005/EffectiveAnti-CartelRegimesBuildingBlocks.pdf.
15. Compare, eg, Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890
(2007), with Commission Regulation 2790/1999, Application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to
Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21, 23 ("Article 4
The exemption provided for in Article 2 shall not apply to vertical agreements which, directly or
indirectly, in isolation or in combination with other factors under the control of the parties, have
as their object: (a) the restriction of the buyer's ability to determine its sale price, without
prejudice to the possibility of the supplier's imposing a maximum sale price or recommending a
sale price, provided that they do not amount to a fixed or minimum sale price as a result of
pressure from, or incentives offered by, any of the parties .... ").
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oligopolistic market structures" and where, precisely, the boundary lies
between successful competition and unlawful dominance.'7 These three
areas, however, have one similarity: the law prohibits restraints of trade,
and the relevant prosecutor, or, in jurisdictions that have created private
rights of action, the private plaintiff, is required to prove that the restraint
harms competition.
The law regarding mergers and acquisitions falls into a different
category of antitrust enforcement in several respects. Most significantly,
modem merger statutes speak in predictive terms; mergers may be
prohibited if they "tend to substantially restrict competition" in a
properly defined relevant market and may be blocked before
consummation. In a globalizing world, many large transactions cross
borders and thus are subject to review by more than one government
antitrust agency. In addition, acquisitions may involve key national
industries, and may touch upon national security interests or national
champion status. Finally, government enforcement agencies investiga-
ting proposed mergers do not have the luxury of lengthy investigations;
time is of the essence in a proposed merger, and failure to prohibit a
transaction before it is consummated makes any future challenge as
difficult as "unscrambling eggs."' 8
This Article analyzes merger review across different regimes, with
particular focus on China, the newest jurisdiction that has adopted a
comprehensive competition law of general application. China adopted
16. Compare E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1984)
(stating that oligopoly behavior is not an unfair method of competition under FTC Act §5 where
no agreement or conspiracy was found), with Joined Cases C-395 & C-396/96 P, Compagnie
Mar. Belge Transp. SA v. Comm'n, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1365, paras. 36, 42, 48 (discussing collective
dominance), and Discussion Paper of the Directorate General for Competition on the Application
of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses paras. 44-47 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf ("For collective dominance to
exist under Article 82, two or more undertakings must from an economic point of view present
themselves or act together on a particular market as a collective entity... [T]he existence of an
agreement or of other links in law is not indispensable to a finding of a collective dominant
position.... Undertakings in oligopolistic markets may sometimes be able to raise prices
substantially above the competitive level without having recourse to any explicit agreement or
concerted practice.... Indeed, they may be able to co-ordinate their behaviour on the market by
observing and reacting to each other's behaviour.").
17. Compare United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58-59 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 952 (2001), vith Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Comm'n, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601.
18. Staples, 970 E Supp. at 1091 ("The strong public interest in effective enforcement of
the antitrust laws weighs heavily in favor of an injunction in this case, as does the need to
preserve meaningful relief following a full administrative trial on the merits. 'Unscrambling the
eggs' after the fact is not a realistic option in this case.... [T]he Court finds that it is extremely
unlikely, if the Court denied the plaintiff's motion and the merger were to go through, that the
merger could be effectively undone and the companies divided if the agency later found that the
merger violated the antitrust laws.").
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its first comprehensive Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of general
application on August 30, 2007, effective August 1, 2008. This Article is
divided into five Parts: Part II analyzes the Chinese AML as it pertains
to mergers." Part III examines the pre-merger notification guidelines for
foreign acquisitions issued by the Ministry of Commerce and other
governmental agencies on March 8, 2007,0 and the "legislative history"
of the pre-merger notification thresholds, which went through two
successive drafts and significant amendments between March and
August, 2008. Part IV addresses international benchmarking. Part V
examines key unanswered questions and issues in the guidelines. Finally,
Part VI concludes.
II. CHINESE ANTI-MONOPOLY AND MERGER LAWS
A. Chinese Anti-MonopolyLaw
After more than a dozen years of drafting, China adopted its first
antitrust law of general application on August 30, 2007.2 The AML
became effective on August 1, 2008.22 The statute follows the substantive
format of the majority of competition laws, dealing separately with
agreements in restraint of trade, monopolies or abuses of dominant
positions, and mergers or concentrations." The language of these
substantive provisions borrows heavily from articles 81 and 82 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community;24 however, it cannot be
known whether actual practice and enforcement will diverge from the
European precedent in advance of the subsequent legal developments in
Chinese antitrust law." Articles 1 and 4 of the AML, however, suggest
19. A detailed comparative analysis of the merger laws of selected jurisdictions follows in
a companion article.
20. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, Aug. 8, 2006, effective Sept. 8, 2007), translation
available at http://www.marketavenue.cn/upload/policy/Policy-134.htm.
21. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 68
(P.R.C.), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/GeneralLawsand
Regulations/BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575.pdf.
22. See id
23. See id. art. 13 (monopoly agreements), arts. 17-18 (abuse of dominant market
position), arts. 20-31 (concentrations).
24. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10, 1997, arts. 86-87, 1997
O.J. (C 340) 3.
25. A detailed analysis of these sections is beyond the scope of this Article. For a general
introduction to and summary of the Chinese AML, see Yong Huang, Pursuing the Second Best:
The History Momentum, and Remaining Issues of China s Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST
L.J. 117 (2008); Bruce M. Owen et al., China 's Competition Policy Reforms: The Ant-Monopoly
Law and Beyond, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 231 (2008); Xiaoye Wang, ighfights of China s NewAnti-
[Vol. 18
CHINESE MERGER GUIDELINES
that the interpretation may differ in some important respects. Article 1
provides that "[t]his law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and
restraining monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the
market, enhancing economic efficiency, safeguarding the interests of
consumers and social public interest, [and] promoting the healthy
development of the socialist market economy" while article 4 empowers
the central government to promulgate and implement "competition rules
which accord with the socialist market economy, perfects macro-control,
and advances a unified, open, competitive and orderly market system."26
The pre-merger notification guidelines discussed in this article are the
first of these rules to have been published, and it is anticipated that other
guidelines in the merger area, and potentially other substantive and
procedural issues, may be forthcoming."
The identity and constitution of government agencies that will be
responsible for enforcement are not delineated in the statute. However, it
appears likely that in time there will be multiple agencies with
enforcement duties. The preexisting competition laws have been
enforced by three government agencies: the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) has responsibility for concentrations, the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has enforcement
responsibilities over the cartels and agreements articles, and the State
Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC) has a bureau with an
antimonopoly division. In addition, regulators of important sectors of
the Chinese economy currently have authority over competitive issues in
their sectors. For example, the Ministry of Information Industry (MlII) is
responsible for competition regulation in the telecommunications sector.29
The regulated sector of the economy could become increasingly
important as key firms in regulated industries seek to compete globally
and engage in mergers." Accordingly, if this allocation of authority
Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 133 (2008); Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on the Chinese Anti-
Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 73 (2008); ADRIAN EMCH & QIAN HAO, THE NEW CHINESE
ANTI-MoNoPOLY LAWMAN OVERVIEW (2007), available athttp://ssrn.corn/abstract-1 030451.
26. Anti-Monopoly Law arts. 1, 4.
27. Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, The Anti-Monopoly Law in China: Where
Do We Standg 3 COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 184-85 (2007), available at http://papers.ssm.com/
sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1075428 (follow "Download" hyperlink; then follow "New York,
USA" hyperlink).
28. Id at 189-90.
29. Id. at 190.
30. See, e.g., China Unicorn Unveils Details ofMerger ith China Netcom, CHINA DAILY,
Aug. 7, 2008, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-06/02/content 6729822.htm; China
Orders 6 Telcoms To Merge Their Assets, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2008, at C6, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/26/business/worldbusiness/26telecom.html; China Begins
Revamp of Its Telcom Sector, NYTIMES.COM, May 23, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/
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continues, it can be predicted that MOFCOM would be responsible for
concentrations, and the SAIC would have responsibility for the abuse of
dominance articles of the AML.
Enforcement multiplicity is not unknown in the international
antitrust community, with the American experience representing one of
the more complex and diffuse systems. Federal antitrust laws are
enforced by both the United States Department of Justice Antitrust
Division and the Federal Trade Commission, which possess some
overlapping and some distinct authority.' Outside the realm of official
enforcement, American antitrust laws include a private right of action for
those injured in "business or property,"3 suffer "antitrust injury,"33 and
have sufficient standing to bring them within the causal requirements of
the statute " to recover treble damages" or equitable relief.6 Finally, State
Attorneys General are empowered to bring antitrust actions for treble
damages and injunctions on behalf of the governmental entities they
represent when those entities were injured as purchasers,37 as parens
patriae on behalf of their natural person citizens, 8 and for equitable relief
on behalf of the hazardous interest of the state economy.9
However, the potential result of a trifurcation of enforcement
responsibilities in China would be more complex and challenging. The
23/technology/23iht-chimobile.1.13157837.html?r:l; Tan Wei, China Telcom Could Possibly
Merge with China Unicorn While China Mobile Could Merge with China Netcom, Source Says,
FINANCIAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/75clb2c8-4b2e-Ildc-861a-
0000779fd2ac.html.
31. The Justice Department is responsible for enforcing the Sherman Act while the FTC's
mandate is found in the Federal Trade Commission Act, Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2006). There are distinctions at the margins: the DOJ has criminal authority while
the FTC is limited to civil and administrative remedies under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 57b.
There is some authority in dicta to suggest that "unfair methods of competition" under FTC Act
section 5 may be broader than the antitrust laws with respect to the requirement of a "contract,
combination or conspiracy" of Sherman Act section 1. FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 721
n. 19 (1948). However, the Commission subsequently rejected this dicta. Intcnim Report on the
Study of the FTC Pricing Policies, S. REP. No. 81-27, at 62-63 (1949). But see E.I du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 E2d 128, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15; see also Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330
(1979).
33. SeeBrunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
34. See Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519(1983).
35. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
36. Id § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26; see also Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104
(1986).
37. See Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 452 (1945); Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe
Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1906).
38. Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15c.
39. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1972) (finding that a state
may sue for injunctive relief but not for damages for harm to the general economy).
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key competitive issues identified in the AML-agreements, monopoli-
zation (abuse of dominance), and mergers (concentrations)-are
inherently related and cannot easily be separated in an investigation or
enforcement proceeding. A collective abuse of dominance investigation
and action, for example, necessarily includes proof of agreements or
"joint dominance" in restraint of trade.4" A single-firm abuse of
dominance case must necessarily include proof of anticompetitive
abusive tactics, potentially including, for example, vertical agreements in
restraint of trade or other anticompetitive behavior.4' Issues of market
definition are critical to both concentration and dominance theories,
investigations, and enforcement actions.42 The expertise required can
efficiently be assembled in a single agency, and the potential necessity of
duplication may be unduly complex and inefficient, especially at the
early stages of interpretation and enforcement of a new statute.
B. Chinese Merger Law
The AML statutory provisions on mergers, referred to as
"concentrations," also appear to be drawn from the European Union
Merger Regulation,43 but the statute and guidelines, discussed below,
share a strong resemblance to U.S. doctrine developed through common
law cases on the subject." AML chapter IV, comprising articles 20
through 31, details the mandatory pre-merger notification process,
investigation procedure, procedure for promulgating decisions and for
appeals, and substantive standard to be applied. Article 28 provides:
Where a concentration has or may have [the] effect of eliminating or
restricting competition, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State
Council shall make a decision to prohibit the concentration. However, if
the business operators concerned can prove that the concentration will
bring more positive impact than negative impact on competition, or the
40. See, e.g., Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SB-
GroBmdrkte GmbH & Co. KG, 1971 E.C.R. 487, paras. 14-19.
41. See, e.g., LePage's, Inc. v. 3M, 324 E3d 141, 144 (3d Cir. 2003) (exclusionary
conduct); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 E3d 34, 58, 106-07 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Case C-
62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm'n, 1991 E.C.R. 1-3359 (predatory pricing); Case 27/76,
United Brands Co. v. Comm'n, 1978 E.C.R. 207, paras. 159-161, 182-183, 193-194 (refusal to
deal).
42. See, e.g., New York v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 926 R Supp. 321, 359 (2d Cir. 1995)
(merger case); Microsofi Corp., 253 E3d at 81 (monopoly case).
43. Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1-22 [hereinafter EC Merger
Regulation].
44. See supm notes 33-34, 36-37, 39,41-42 and accompanying text.
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concentration is pursuant to public interests, the Anti-monopoly Authority
under the State Council may decide not to prohibit the concentration.45
The section appears to share the approach of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers "where in any line of commerce
... in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be




This standard is predictive and concerned with the probable effects of
proposed mergers and does not require the relevant enforcement agency4
7
to wait until after the anticompetitive effects of a transaction have
occurred to challenge the proposed acquisition.4 ' However, there appear
to be important differences between the two substantive standards.
While U.S. law requires a "substantial" harm to competition or tendency
to create a monopoly, the Chinese section speaks in terms of two
alternative standards. First, a transaction is invalid if it actually
eliminates competition.49  Because the Anti-Monopoly Authority is
empowered to challenge a merger before it has been consummated, the
elimination standard could be intended to cover only mergers that
extinguish competition, that is, a merger in a two-firm market that would
result in a monopoly. The alternative test prohibits mergers that "may...
restrict competition."" It is not yet clear whether this standard is even
stronger than the U.S. "may substantially lessen competition" standard,
thus permitting the Chinese Enforcement Agency to challenge a
45. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING CoMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 68,
ch. IV, art. 28 (P.R.C.), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/General
LawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575.pdf.
46. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
47. Most merger challenges are brought by the Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
or the Federal Trade Commission. In addition, there is a private right of action that enables any
person who has been injured in "business or property" to sue. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15.
Historically, however, most cases have been filed by the government agencies responsible for
enforcing the statute. But see Consol. Gold Fields v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 254-55 (2d
Cir. 1989). State attorneys general have been more active in challenging proposed mergers
pursuant to their authority to represent their natural person citizens either as parens patriae,
Clayton Act § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15c, or on behalf of the state, Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439
(1945), seeking injunctive relief under Clayton Act section 16, California v. Am. Stores Co., 495
U.S. 271, 274-75 (1989), or on behalf of the general interest of the state economy, Hawaii v.
Standard Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 252-54 (1972).
48. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294,296 (1962).
49. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING CoMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 68




2009] CHINESE MERGER GUIDELINES
transaction that insubstantially lessens competition.5' That position
appears to be less likely in light of the remainder of article 28. In a
departure from the American form of antitrust statutes that are broad,
general, and constitution-like in language,52 article 28 implicitly refers to
U.S. case developments, as well as the EU merger regulation, and creates
a rule of reason balancing test 3 with Chinese characteristics." Justice
Breyer, concurring in part in California Dental Ass'n v FTC,5
enunciated a clear statement of both the substantive issues and burden-
shifting in a moderm American rule of reason case:
I would break that question down into four classical, subsidiary antitrust
questions: (1) What is the specific restraint at issue? (2) What are its likely
anticompetitive effects? (3) Are there offsetting procompetitive justify-
cations? (4) Do the parties have sufficient market power to make a
difference?
6
Article 28, similarly, places the burden on the merging firms to
perform the competitive balancing test and demonstrate that the benefits
to competition obviously outweigh the harm. Although it is not clear
whether the "obvious" standard refers to the quantum of evidence, that is,
51. See SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST LAw, INTELLECTUAL PROP., & INT'L LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N,
JOINT SUBMISSION ON THE PROPOSED ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
24 (2005), available at http://www.abanet.org/intlaw/committees/business regulation/antitrust/
chinacommentsantimonopoly.pdf (recommending that "substantial" harm to competition be the
standard for then-article 30 of the AML, which prohibited concentrations that "may lead to
creation or strengthening of dominant market positions as well as elimination or restriction of
market competition").
52. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933).
53. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 28. Article 28 provides:
Where a concentration has or may have effect of eliminating or restricting competition,
the Anti-monopoly Authority under the State Council shall make a decision to prohibit
the concentration. However, if the business operators concerned can prove that the
concentration will bring more positive impact than negative impact on competition, or
the concentration is pursuant to public interests, the Anti-monopoly Authority under the
State Council may decide not to prohibit the concentration.
54. AML article 1 states, "This Law is enacted for the purpose of preventing and
restraining monopolistic conducts, protecting fair competition in the market, enhancing economic
efficiency, safeguarding the instruments of consumers and social public interest, [and] promoting
the healthy development of the socialist market economy." Id art. 1. Article 4 provides, "The
State constitutes and carries out competition rules which accord with the socialist market
economy, perfects macro-control, and advances a unified, open, competitive and orderly market
system." Id art. 4.
55. 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring). The majority recognized that "rule
of reason" analysis is a sliding scale, requiring an inquiry meet for the case, but left the
substantive content of the test and relevant burdens of proof of that inquiry for future cases to
develop.
56. Id at 782.
57. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 28.
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clear and convincing rather than a simple preponderance standard, or the
substantive measure, that is, an "obvious" benefit may be a very
substantial benefit far outweighing the threatened harm, the anticipated
Guidelines will hopefully clarify.
The legal analysis employed in reviewing proposed mergers is set
forth in article 27 of the AML and includes issues familiar to a student of
the American and European Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines58
and controlling cases. 9 The five relevant factors to be evaluated by the
Chinese merger enforcement agency are: the market shares and power of
the merging firms, concentration in the relevant market, the effects of
concentration on entry and "technological progress" the effects of the
market concentration on consumers and competitors, and the impact on
"national economic development." Finally, "other elements" may be
considered; but most importantly, the AML requires that these
enumerated factors be considered because they have an effect on the
"market competition."' Thus, arguably, only competitive concerns are
relevant to the review." Pared to its essence, the evaluation requires firs
definition of the relevant market; secon identification of the market
participants; third, calculation of market concentration; fourth,
consideration of the likely competitive effects of the transaction on
consumers, and firms; and fifth, likelihood of entry. Several of the
relevant factors remain to be explained in the Guidelines and applied in
practice. It is possible to interpret the "influence ... on technological
progress" factor as referring to an arguable effect on competition in the
market, since competition is traditionally recognized as serving the goal
of efficiency. Similarly, it is possible to interpret the "influence ... on
national economic development" factor as arguably expressing
competitive market ideals. However, the precatory language of AML
General Provisions articles 1 and 4, if deployed as part of the legal
58. U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6; European Comm'n,
Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers Under the Council Regulation on the
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 2004 O.J. (C 31) 5-18 [hereinafter EC
Horizontal Merger Guidelines].
59. See, e.g., Case T-342/99, Airtours v. Comm'n, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2585, paras. 59, 195;
FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 E3d 708, 713-14 (D.C. Cir. 2001); FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 E3d
1066, 1072-73 (D.D.C. 1997).
60. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 27.
61. Id
62. Id. This is an important qualifier, and it is premature to predict precisely how the
analysis of article 27 will be deployed in practice because no substantive Merger Guidelines have
been issued nor have any proposed concentrations been decided under the AML at this writing.
Whether or not considerations unrelated to competition are relevant in antitrust analysis has long
been resolved in the negative in the United States. See, e.g., Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'l Eng'rs v.
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1987).
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analysis of the Chinese agency, could bring noncompetition and
noneconomic considerations into merger analysis and decision making.
On the other hand, the AML specifically excludes one noneconomic
factor in the merger review undertaken by the Anti-Monopoly Authority.
Any national security issues presented by the participation in a
transaction of a foreign investor must be determined "in accordance with
the relevant State provisions."'6 Clearly, national security issues may be
presented, but the AMIL drafters chose to segregate this review from the
economic analysis of the merger.'
The article 27 list of factors is not unlike the stepwise analysis of
the U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which requires finsi a definition
of the relevant product and geographic markets; second, identification of
the market participants and their market shares; third, calculation of the
market concentration using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (FHI);
fourth, analysis of the predicted competitive effects of the merger in
terms of unilateral and coordinated effects; fth, consideration of the
relative ease of entry; and finally, determination of whether one of the
parties satisfies the criteria for raising a failing firm defense.65
Beyond the general substantive antimerger provision, the remaining
articles of AML chapter IV are dedicated to the new pre-merger
notification requirement, a description of the investigatory process under
that regime, and the standards and procedures for decisions on pending
notifications.
Article 21 of the AML requires "business operators" to file a pre-
merger notification to the Anti-Monopoly Authority' in all transactions
63. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 31.
64. This is consistent with the practice under United States antitrust law, in which the
appropriate enforcement agency, the FTC or DOJ Antitrust Division, engages in the competitive
analysis while a Congressional Committee is charged with assessment of potential national
security considerations.
65. See U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6, § 5; EC Horizontal
Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, art. VIII.
66. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 21. This agency, to be established by the State Council, is
defined in article 10 as the agency responsible for enforcing the AML. The Enforcement Agency
will also have authority to designate "corresponding agencies" in the twenty-three provinces; the
five autonomous regions of Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Tibet, and Xinjiang of China; and
the four Chinese municipalities directly under the central government (Beijing, Chongqing,
Shanghai, and Tianjin) to enforce the AML. The Anti-Monopoly Bureau was established in
August 2008 by the Ministry of Commerce and has responsibility over pre-merger notification,
investigation, and merger enforcement. Interview with Shang Ming, Director General of the
Anti-Monopoly Bureau Under the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (Feb.
2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/antiurust/at-source/09/02/Feb09-SourceFull2-26f.pdf.
The delegation clause of article 10 does not appear to be akin to antitrust enforcement under
American-style federalism, in which the states are empowered to enforce their own state antitrust
laws. State Attorneys General are authorized to bring actions on behalf of their natural person
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that result in "concentration" by merger or acquisition of "control"67 and
that meet the threshold to be set by Agency Guidelines. There is a
statutory safe harbor for concentrations, as opposed to mergers that result
in the acquisition of control, above which pre-merger filings are not
required."
Once the required notification documents have been filed by the
relevant parties 9 and are complete, the Anti-Monopoly Authority has
thirty days to make a preliminary investigation."° The notification is
deemed "not filed," and the time period does not begin to run until the
submission is complete." Consistent with practice in the United States, if
the thirty-day period expires without any further action by the Chinese
Anti-Monopoly Authority, the transaction is effectively deemed not to be
citizens as parens patriae under federal antitrust law by Sherman Act section 4A, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15(c) (2006), on behalf of the state as a purchaser under Sherman Act sections 4 and 16,
Georgia v. Pa. R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945), and on behalf of the general economy of the state for
equitable relief, Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251 (1972). In no sense do the
Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice or the Federal Trade Commission
"empower" the state enforcement officials to act, nor do federal agency representatives supervise
or control them. There has been, however, ongoing consultation and cooperation in investigations
and litigation between state and federal antitrust enforcement agencies.
67. The definition of "control" is an area of concern raised by some commentators on the
AML. They questioned whether the definition was sufficiently clear to give notice to affected
firms. See SECTIONS OF ANTITRUST LAw, INTELLECTUAL PROP., & INT'L LAw, supra note 51.
Specifically, "control" is not independently defined in article 20, which refers to acquisition of
"control ... by virtue of acquiring their equities or assets" (article 20(2)), and used in the context
of "possibility of exercising decisive influence on other business operators by virtue of contact or
any other means." Anti-Monopoly Law art. 20(3).
68. The essence of the safe harbor provision is to exempt firms from filing if the
transaction in question is a concentration and not acquisition of majority control. Specifically, if
one firm already holds at least fifty percent of the voting rights of the others in the transaction or
if another firm, not participating in the concentration at hand, already controls at least fifty
percent of the "voting rights of every other business operator whether of the equity or the assets."
Anti-Monopoly Law art. 22.
69. Article 23 states that the "business operator" must submit the required notification
and documents without designating which firms are responsible. Id. art. 23. The first and second
drafts of the proposed Guidelines identified which firms to a transaction must, or may, file. See
discussion infra Part III.A-B.. This provision, however, was omitted from the final Notification
Thresholds. See discussion infa Part III.B.3.
70. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 25. The waiting period for preliminary review in the United
States pursuant to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, Clayton Act § 7A, is thirty
days after receipt of the pre-merger notification materials, and fifteen days for cash tender offers.
15 U.S.C. § 18a (2006). The European Union Merger Regulation decisions finding the notified
transaction not within the scope of the Regulation or compatible should be made by no later than
twenty-five working days following a completed filing of the pre-merger notification materials
(extended to thirty-five working days in some circumstances defined in the Regulation).
Decisions under articles 8(1) to 8(3) are required to be made a maximum of ninety working days
after proceedings have been initiated, or 104 working days in cases involving commitments from
the parties. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 43, art. 10.
71. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 24.
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prohibited and the parties are permitted to complete their transaction."
This "file and wait procedure" is contrary to the process of the EU
Commission, which is required to publish a decision either clearing or
prohibiting every proposed transaction subject to the pre-merger
notification requirement.73 If the Anti-Monopoly Authority deems
further investigation to be necessary, it has up to another ninety days
from the date of such a decision. 4 This ability to conduct a second-stage
investigation follows the practice in the United States and the EU;
however, the AML statute omits significant details of the process and
fails to address whether or not the Agency may order the parties to
produce additional documents and information. The second-request
practice in the United States and Europe is found in their respective
statutes, and the standard format of the request for documents and other
practical advice for parties is widely disseminated by the agencies.75
The investigation may be extended for a final sixty-day period with
the consent of the parties, or if the materials previously submitted are
deemed "inaccurate and [in] need [of] further verification'" or if things
have "significantly changed after declaration." 6 These latter conditions
are not explained in the AML but apparently are determinations to be
made at the discretion of the Anti-Monopoly Authority. There is no
provision in the AML for such determinations to be reviewed or
contested. If either time period-the ninety-day further review or sixty-
day final extension--expires without action by the Anti-Monopoly
Authority, the parties may implement their transaction." Again, this
follows U.S. practice, under which the relevant agency does not
"approve" a transaction, but rather declines to challenge it, and contrasts
with European practice, which requires affirmative approval or
prohibition of every notified transaction. If, however, the Anti-Monopoly
Authority determines to prohibit a notified transaction or attach
conditions to approval, it must publish its decision." This requirement of
publication likely will be among the most beneficial results of the AML
for scholars of Chinese antitrust law, especially if the published decisions
72. Id. art. 25.
73. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 43, art. 8.
74. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 26.
75. See, e.g., ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DOJ, MERGER REVIEW PROCESS INITATrVE (2006),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/220237.pdf; FTC, Premerger/Hart-Scott-Rodino
Premerger Notification Program, Statute, Rules and Formal Interpretations, http://www.fc.gov/
bc/hsr/hsrbook.shtm (last visited Sept. 20, 2009).
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include the Agency's reasoning and analysis. Although the American
practice of nonopposition to a concentration transaction without opinion
is efficient, following the European Commission practice of publication
of approvals would be instructive, especially in the initial years of merger
law development in China.
The AML provides for three different determinations on a pre-
merger notification: the Anti-Monopoly Authority may permit the
transaction to proceed, prohibit it, or permit it with "restrictive
conditions."79 If the decision is to prohibit or permit with conditions, the
decision must be published."° This publication requirement adds to the
transparency of merger review and decision making. By adding to the
published law under the AMIL, it can promote consistent, well-reasoned
decisions useful to the legal and business community.
The contents of the required notification are briefly listed in article
23 of the AMIL, and more complete requirements are identified in the
first and second drafts of the Notification Guidelines but omitted from
the final Notification Thresholds.8' Briefly, the notification is required to
include a "declaration paper," the agreement, the previous year's audited
financial and accounting reports of "the business operators involved in
the concentration," and an "explanation[] on the effect of the concentra-
tion on the relevant market competition."82  The competitive effects
explanation potentially requires a significant analysis, starting with the
definition of the relevant market(s), identification of competitors and
their market shares, HHI calculations, entry analysis, and an economic
analysis of the predicted competitive effects of the transaction. The
article also authorizes the Enforcement Agency to require production of
"other documents and materials" to facilitate its investigation. 3
III. CHINESE PRE-MERGER NOTIFICATION RuLES
A. Foreign Acquisitions
The first set of pre-merger notification regulations were adopted
prior to, and independent of, the Chinese AML and applied to
acquisitions of Chinese enterprises by foreign investors (Foreign M&A
79. Id. art. 29.
80. Id art. 30.
81. See discussion hifra Part III.
82. Anti-Monopoly Law art. 23(2).
83. Id.
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Rules, Filing Guidelines).' The statute, entitled Provisions on the
Takeover of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors,85 contained
articles requiring pre-merger notifications for certain acquisitions of
domestic Chinese firms by foreign investors." Pursuant to these Foreign
M&A Rules, the Antitrust Investigation Office of the Department of
Treaty and Law of the Ministry of Commerce issued Guidelines for the
required pre-merger notifications." Though limited in scope, they
nevertheless bear a familial relationship to the AML pre-merger
notification guidelines that followed two years later. Several versions of
the Guidelines were made available in draft form by MOFCOM, and
interested parties were invited to consult on the substance of the Filing
Guidelines with the Antitrust Investigation Office with the goal of
"improving the work for antitrust review."8  Interested groups and
organizations, including the American Bar Association, Sections of
Antitrust Law and International Law, filed comments and recommenda-
tions on the draft with the Ministry.
84.
[The] 2006 Revisions to the Merger & Acquisition Rules: introduced separate
requirements for foreign acquisitions of Chinese firms that "result in actual control by
the foreign investor" and "involve key industries." MOFCOM may act to block,
modify or unwind unreported transactions with actual or potential "material impact" on
the "economic security of the State."
Zhu Zhongliang, Challenges and Opportunities-Implementation of China's Anti-Monopoly Law
(Apr. 4, 2008), http://www.abanet.org/intlaw.spring08/materials/ZhuChallengesandOpportunities
0804.pdf. Zhu Zhongliang is the Deputy Division-Chief of the Anti-Monopoly Investigation
Office, Department of Treaty & Law of the Ministry of Commerce of PRC.
85. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin.
Comm'n of the State Council, the China Secs. Regulatory Comm'n, the State Admin. for Indus.
& Commerce, the State Admin. of Taxation, and the State Admin. of Foreign Exchs., Aug. 8,
2006), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI.EN/Laws/GeneralLawsand
Regulations/MinisterialRulings/P020061128374924214111 .pdf.
86. Id. arts. 51-54.
87. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L LAW, AM. BAR Ass'N,
COMMENTS ON THE GUIDELINES ON ANTITRUST FILINGS FOR MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS OF
DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES BY FOREIGN INVESTORS 1 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/
antitrust/at-comments/2007/03-07/comm-PRC.pdf (commenting on the draft version issued
March 26, 2007).
88. Letter from Shang Fa Jingzheng, Antitrust Investigation Office of the Ministry of
Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Notice of Meeting and Guidelines for Antitrust
Filing for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Mar. 8, 2007)
(on file with author).
89. This discussion of the Filing Guidelines is based on a translation of the Chinese Draft
Guidelines that was previously posted at the MOFCOM Web site. The translation used in this
Article was provided by Squire, Sanders & Dempsey LLP and was used by the ABA Sections in
preparing and submitting their comments on the draft guidelines (on file with author).
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Although this first set of Filing Guidelines was directed to foreign
acquisitions of domestic (Chinese) firms, it is an apparent predecessor to
the draft Pre-Merger Notification Guidelines and final Merger
Notification Thresholds promulgated under the AML and likely served
as a useful opportunity for the Chinese drafters to both analyze
competitive issues inherent in some mergers and determine whether and
in what circumstances it is appropriate to investigate a proposed
transaction." There is general consensus that most mergers do not
produce sufficient market power to produce anticompetitive effects
unilaterally or collectively and are therefore either competitively neutral
or pro-competitive.' Accordingly, a sophisticated government agency
responsible for merger enforcement must develop a framework to
distinguish at the outset those transactions that may be competitively
problematic from those that are not, and must then dedicate the limited
agency time and resources to those transactions that raise significant
competitive concerns. These first Filing Guidelines, however, did not
make that distinction on its face, requiring every foreign acquisition to
file a pre-merger notification before the transaction could go forward.
Were these Filing Guidelines adopted as part of an antitrust law, that
legislative choice could be questioned. However, the Foreign M&A
Rules-the enabling authority for the Filing Guidelines-were not solely
a competition statute but were significantly concerned with foreign
investment.92 Therefore, the starting point of universal review can be laid
at the door of a government concern other than competition.
Nevertheless, these Filing Guidelines served an additional substantial
purpose, that is, that of focusing the drafters' judgment on what kinds of
information would be most useful to make a competition assessment of a
transaction.
90. "Abolishment of Discriminative Measures: Once AML comes into effect on August
1, 2008, the Merger & Acquisition Rules (2006) will be abolished and replaced by the new
implementing regulation consistent with the AML and not limiting [sic] to the M&A of Chinese
firms by foreign investors." Zhu, supra note 84.
91. See, e.g., U.S. DOJ/FTC COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1
(2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.pdf, David L. Meyer,
Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. DOJ, Merger Enforcement Is Alive and Well at the
Department of Justice, Remarks at the ABA Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 15, 2007)
(transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/227713.pdf).
92. Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors
(promulgated by the Ministry of Commerce, the State-Owned Assets Supervision & Admin.
Comm'n of the State Council, the China Secs. Regulatory Comm'n, the State Admin. for Indus.
& Commerce, the State Admin. of Taxation, and the State Admin. of Foreign Exchs., Aug. 8,




The framework of the Filing Guidelines will be familiar to scholars
versed in the pre-merger notification rules of the United States93 and the
European Union, " although there are important distinctions and
omissions in form and substance. While the general intent of the Filing
Guidelines can, perhaps, be intuited based on an understanding of U.S.
and European substantive merger guidelines, cases, and scholarly
commentary, there are two essential problems with any such effort at
interpretation. First, the Chinese legal system is largely a civil law-type
system, according primary deference to the actual language of the
statute."5 In civil law systems, the optimum interpretation can be found
only on the face of the statute or, alternatively, by certification from a
trial judge to senior judges for an opinion on a contested meaning.
Second, waiting for any such statutory construction would defeat the
purpose of speedy pre-merger notification and ill-serve merging parties.
The structure of the Filing Guidelines was as such: first, they clarified
the obligation to file and identify which firms are responsible; secona
they stated the time line for submission of pre-merger information and
materials; thiri and most importantly, they identified required and
optional information; and finally, they described the investigation and
review process."
The Filing Guidelines first set a deadline for filing and identified
the party or parties required to make the filing.97 The acquiring (or
"merging") firm was primarily responsible for making the required filing
in the first instance; however, the Filing Guidelines provided that the
other party to the transaction "may" also file, depending on the "specific
circumstances of the individual case."" The circumstances relevant to the
decision to file by the other party were not defined in the Filing
Guidelines. Firms entering into the transaction were given the option of
filing individually or jointly, but this section did not acknowledge that
there may be important disincentives to filing jointly, nor did it identify
information that may or may not be shared by merging firms before the
transaction had been consummated. Before a merger, competing firms
were prohibited from sharing information of competitive significance on
93. U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6.
94. EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 58.
95. Stanley Lubman, LookingforLawin China 20 COLUM. J. AsiAN L. 1 (2006).
96. See Guidelines for Antitrust Review Filing for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Draft for Comments) (promulgated by the Ministry of
Commerce, Mar. 8, 2007).
97. See id.
98. Id. § 1.
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the theory that, in the event of a failure of the merger," the firms would
remain competitors, plainly prohibited from anticompetitive horizontal
agreements. Information sharing is not necessarily a violation of
antitrust laws in the United States or European Union, but, depending on
the market positions of the competitors and the nature of the shared
information, it may lead to antitrust liability.' The Filing Guidelines
permitted firms to file on their own behalf or by counsel; however, only
attorneys admitted to the Chinese bar and members of Chinese law firms
could participate in this filing.' °'
These Guidelines gave two unranked alternatives for the pre-merger
filing deadline: "before the plan of the M&A transaction is announced
to the general public" or, alternatively, "at the same time when such
antitrust filing is submitted to the competent authority of the country
where [the] proposed transaction takes place."'' 2 In complex transactions
involving multinational firms, it is unclear where this locus might be.
Possibilities include the jurisdiction of incorporation of the foreign firm,
but other alternatives are plausible.' 3
99. The failure of a transaction may be the result of a disapproval of the merger by any of
the government agencies with jurisdiction to review it or for business reasons unrelated to the pre-
merger approval process. Such "gun jumping" may, in some cases, lead to antitrust liability. See
William Blumenthal, The Rhetoric of Gun Jumping, Remarks Before the Association of
Corporate Counsel, Annual Antitrust Seminar of Greater New York Chapter (Nov. 10, 2005),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/blumenthal/20051110gunjumping.pdf.
100. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422,435 (1978) (holding that mens rea is
required in criminal antitrust prosecutions); United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S.
86, 113 (1975) (holding that dissemination of price information is not a per se violation); United
States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 338-40 (1969) (holding that information
exchange in oligopoly characterized by excess capacity and easy entry violated section 1, but not
a per se violation according to Justice Fortas, concurring); Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United
States, 268 U.S. 563, 582 (1925) (holding that the mere exchange of information is not "an
unreasonable restraint" even though information exchange, here through a trade association,
"tends to stabilize that trade or business and to produce uniformity of prices and trade practice");
Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12 (1921) (holding that a trade
association rule requiring members, accounting to one-third of production, to submit price and
sales data, which was summarized and disseminated by the association, violates the Sherman
Act).
101. Guidelines for Antitrust Review Filing for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Draft for Comments) § I. Non-Chinese attorneys may act as
advisors, but noncitizens are not permitted to be admitted to the bar in China.
102. Id. § 11. 1. A prior draft had specified two different alternatives, including, first "after
the M&A agreement filing related hereto is signed, and before the M&A transaction is
completed." In transactions involving stock tender offers, the draft required that "the antitrust
filing shall be made after such tender offer is announced."
103. This ambiguity was raised in the comments submitted by sections of the American
Bar Association on the Filing Guidelines. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L
LAW, AM. BAR ASS'N, COMMENTS ON THE GUIDELINES ON ANTITRUST FILINGS FOR MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS OF DOMESTIC ENTERPRISES By FOREIGN INVEsToRS 2 (2007).
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The substantive heart of the Filing Guidelines was the catalogue of
materials required to be produced before any merger within the
jurisdiction of the reviewing agency.'" This comprehensive list included
essentially ministerial information about the transaction, 5 identification
information,'" and, finally, substantive information concerning
competition and any competitive effects of the proposed merger.' 7
Section 111(15) permitted the filing party to request a waiver of pre-
merger antitrust review upon submission of supporting materials.'08
Two hard copy sets and an electronic version of the pre-merger
notification documents and other materials were required, and all of the
material was required in Chinese or a Chinese translation."° The Filing
Guidelines recognized that some of the required information could
include confidential business documents and trade secrets, so the party
submitting the notification was permitted to identify sensitive
104. Guidelines for Antitrust Review Filing for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Draft for Comments) §§ 2-19.
105. Id. § 111(1) (letter accompanying the filing); id § 3 (requiring a "letter of
authorization" identifying the "responsible manager" of the party that files the notification or a
Power of Attorney if the filing is made by an agent of the party to the transaction); id § 19
(requiring signatures of each party to the transaction or its agent attesting to the authenticity of the
information submitted).
106. See id. § 111(2) (requiring the "filing party outside China" to submit notarized and
authenticated documents, from a "local notary," in transactions involving a foreign investor that
"merges or acquires domestic enterprises" and "an extra-territorial M&A"). It is not clear
whether the two clauses listed describe different kinds of transactions. See also id. § 111(4)
(providing basic information about the transaction including revenues worldwide and in China);
id § 111(5) (requiring identification of all enterprises that are "affiliated" or "controlled," directly
or indirectly, by each party to the transaction); id. § 111(6) (requiring certificates of incorporation
of enterprises "set up in China" by each party to the transaction); id § II1(7) (requiring a
description of the form of the transaction, anticipated process, and anticipated dates of relevant
events in the transaction); id. § 111(13) (requiring the transaction agreement); id § 1I(14)
(requiring audited financial statements for the past fiscal year); id. § 111(16) (requiring
information about trade associations in relevant markets); id. § Ill(17) (requiring the status of any
pre-merger review in any other jurisdictions).
107. Id § I(8) (requiring definition of the relevant markets); id. § 111(9) (requiring sales
and market share data of parties to the transaction for the past two fiscal years); id. § 111(10)
(requiring identification of the five "top competitors" in the relevant markets); id. § II(11)
(requiring "supply and demand structure in relevant markets" including identification of "major
enterprises" in relevant upstream and downstream markets); id. § 11I(12) (requiring identification
competition in the relevant markets, including information about entry barriers, market exits,
intellectual property rights, economies of scale, and horizontal or vertical cooperation agreements
in the relevant markets).
108. The materials for requesting such waiver are not identified with particularity in the
Guidelines.
109. Guidelines for Antitrust Review Filing for Merger and Acquisition of Domestic
Enterprises by Foreign Investors (Draft for Comments) § III.
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information, request confidentiality and justify the need for secrecy, and
provide a separate, nonconfidential version of the material.'0
The review process potentially involved two stages: an initial
review and an extended review. The initial review could extend over
thirty business days from the date of receipt of the completed materials.
Similar to U.S. pre-merger review practice, if the thirty-day period
expired without further "notice" then the merger may be permitted to
proceed."'  However, the review could be extended for up to another
ninety business days upon simple notification from the reviewing
agency."2 The ninety-day time frame was an important amendment from
a prior draft of the Guidelines, which provided that "the duration of the
review process will then be extended depending on the specific
circumstances of the transaction.""' 3 The change from an open-ended to a
definite period was important for the predictability and transparency of
the review process. Finally, the Guidelines encouraged the party that
filed the materials and its "entrusted agent" to contact the Antitrust
Investigation Office before filing the notification and to consult on
important issues including request for a waiver and specific competitive
information that is specified in the Filing Guidelines."4
It has been reported that a number of foreign investments were
investigated and hearings were held, but no proposed acquisition was
ever rejected under the Foreign M&A Rules Filing Guidelines."5 These
Guidelines have now been superseded by the broader pre-merger
notification and review process in the AML, but remain controlling with
respect to other aspects of the Rules."6
B. AML Pre-Merger Notification Guidelines
1. Initial Draft.7
The Pre-Merger Notification Guidelines drafted for adoption
pursuant to the AML benefit significantly from the previous Guidelines
and show important substantive and procedural developments that move






115. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L LAw, supm note 87.
116. See Zhu, supra note 84.
117. This version of the AML Pre-Merger Notification Guidelines was the first that




convergence." ' The differences between an early and late draft of these
Guidelines also show important developments in the direction of
workability and international convergence, albeit with Chinese
characteristics.' 9
The initial draft, entitled Rules on Notification for Concentration by
State Council, became available unofficially in March 2008.120 This
eighteen-article draft document initially must be distinguished from the
prior Filing Guidelines, which were adopted pursuant to the authority of
the Foreign M&A Rules, discussed above.'2' Under the AML Guidelines,
an "Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority for Reviewing the
Concentration of Undertakings" will be established under the State
Council 22 with responsibility for reviewing proposed mergers. All
transactions that meet the thresholds, discussed below, are required to file
pre-merger notifications, 123 in Chinese translation,' 2' and the penalty for
failure to file, incomplete filings, or submission of "false information" is
subject to the penalties established in articles 48 and 52 of the AML.1 25
Article 2 establishes four alternative thresholds for notification.
126
The first two are objective, related to the size of the firms and
118. See INT'L COMPETITION NETWORK [ICN], RECOMMENDED PRACTICES FOR MERGER
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES 5 (2002), available at http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.
org/media/archive061 1/mnprecpractices.pdf.
119. See Huang, supra note 25, at 131; Yong Huang, Chinese AML: Status & Outlook,
ABA INT'L L. SECTION (2008); WANG XIAOYE, CHALLENGES IN ENFORCING CHINESE
ANTlMONOPOLY LAW (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/iintlaw/spring08/materials/ABA
2008springWangChallengersInEnforcingChinese AntimonopolyLaw.pdf.
120. Rules on Notification for Concentration by the State Council (internal draft) (on file
with author).
121. See discussion supm Part III.A.
122. The State Council, established in 1954, is the highest-ranking governing entity,
headed by the Premier and comprising various subsidiary ministries and commissions. KENNETH
LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM 79, 176-77, 238-39 (2d
ed. 2004).
123. STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., RULES ON NOTIFICATION FOR CONCENTRATION OF [sic]
BY THE STATE COUNCIL (internal draft) art. 2 (2008) (translation on file with author).
124. Id. art. 7.
125. Id. art. 15. These penalties include an injunction mandating that any acts to effectuate
the transaction be halted and reversed plus a fine of up to Y500,000 (AML ch. VII, art. 48), or
orders to comply plus fines of up to Y20,000 per individual and up to Y200,000 per entity (AMIL
ch. VII, art. 52). For "serious" violations, the penalties may be increased to Y20,000 to Y100,000
for individuals and Y200,000 to Y1,000,000 per entity plus potential criminal liability "where a
crime is constituted." Id Chapters 48 and 52 are enforced by the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement
Agency, an entity to be established by the State Council. It is not yet clear whether the
Enforcement Agency will be a separate body from the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority for
Reviewing the Concentration of Undertakings, because both are to be established under the State
Council, and what the relationship between such agencies will be going forward.
126. Id. art. 2.
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specifically to their turnover within China.'27 The second two thresholds
are substantive in nature,'28 effectively seeking to identify those
transactions below the turnover thresholds that nonetheless would
contribute to "the rising tide of concentration" in a relevant market or
otherwise create a level of market power. 9 The first threshold sets the
requirement for filing based on, first, the global turnover of all of the
firms involved in the transaction and, second, the requirement of a nexus
to China in terms of the turnover of one firm involved in the
transaction."' The global minimum is a minimum of twelve billion yuan
renminbi (Y or RMB) for the preceding year.' The turnover requirement
for the Chinese nexus was not specified in the draft available but is
expressed in terms of an increment of millions.'32 The second threshold
is expressed entirely in terms of turnover within China. This section
requires a pre-merger notification of all the firms involved in the
transaction that have a total turnover within Chinese territory that
exceeds Y6 billion.'33 The theoretical basis for these thresholds is the size
of the transaction and significant relationship to China as the potentially
reviewing country. In adopting these standards, China has made an
appropriate choice to identify for review only those transactions of
sufficient size to potentially affect competition in the national economy.
Therefore, it was an important decision to also require a connection with
the Chinese economy in terms of annual turnover."4 Of more importance
is the expression of the required Chinese nexus.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 127 (1986); see also Phila. Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (stating that Congress was concerned with the trends
towards increasing concentration).
130. STATECOUNCILOFTHEP.R.C., supmnote 123, art. 2.
131. Id.
132. Id. art. 2(i). The dollar equivalent ofY12 billion, at the current exchange rate of $1 to
Y6.83814 is $1,760,010,795. Oanda.com, http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic (last visited Oct.
31, 2009) (currency conversion Web site).
133. STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., supra note 123, art. 2(ii). Six billion RMB, at the
exchange rate of 6.83814, as of October 31, 2009, is the U.S. dollar equivalent of $880,005,397.
See Oanda.com, supm note 132.
134. One could take issue with the particular RMB amounts chosen. As a point of
reference, the transaction-size threshold for notification under U.S. standards is $260.7 million, or
between $65.2 million and $260.7 million if one party has annual net sales or assets of at least
$130.0 million and the other party has annual net sales or total assets of at least $13 million in
2009. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 18(a)(2) (2009) (revised annually). Under the EU Merger Regulation,
the filing triggers are based on a combination of worldwide turnover, European turnover, and
impact in a minimum number of Member States. EC Merger Regulation, supra note 43.
Notification is required if the total worldwide turnover of all parties to the concentration is at least
C5 billion and at least two parties to the EU turnover must be at least E250 million unless more
than two-thirds of each party's turnover is from the same Member State. Id Alternatively,
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The first section requires that only one of the undertakings have the
minimum turnover in China. While it is possible that, in a particular
transaction, more than one firm could exceed the required minimum or
that additional transaction participants may have smaller turnovers within
China, the standard expressed in the Guidelines is the threshold.
Assuming that a particular transaction meets only the minimum of one
firm with the required turnover in China, the transaction must not
necessarily result in a net change in terms of effect within China. Before
the merger, there would have been, hypothetically, one firm transacting
business and producing Chinese turnover, and after the transaction, there
would be expected to be no change in the number of competitors, merely
in the ownership of that firm.'35 Accordingly, the basis of this section
appears to be primarily concerned with foreign acquisitions of domestic
firms rather than with anticompetitive threats. This change of control
could have important effects in terms of national security interests, for
example, but the effects are not necessarily related to competition.
Perhaps statutes other than the AML would be better suited to addressing
these noncompetitive concerns.
The second threshold, in requiring that all of the firms involved in
the transaction have a minimum nexus with the Chinese economy, is
directly targeted to those mergers of a size sufficient to affect
competition in the Chinese market. Here, the Chinese nexus requirement
is expressed in comprehensive terms: "All the undertakings to the
concentration [must] have a total turnover of more than Y6 billion within
the territory of China in the previous year."'' 6 The Chinese nexus is
justified and appropriate, because a state has the highest interest in
enforcing competition law with respect to actions that will have a
significant effect on the national economy and its consumers.'
However, this section, at least as translated, is ambiguous. While
the threshold requirement uses inclusive language-"all the
undertakings"--the text appears to be targeted primarily at establishing
that parties to the transaction conduct a minimum amount of business
notification is required if, among other requirements, the aggregate worldwide turnover exceeds
E2.5 billion and turnover of all parties is at least C100 million in three Member States. Id.
135. Other commentators raised this concern. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION
OF INT'L LAW, JOINT COMMENTS 3-4 (2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-
comments/2008/04-08/comrnents-undertakingdraft.pdf.
136. STATECOJNCfLOFTHEP.R.C., supranote 123, art. 2(ii).
137. The American standard for extraterritorial application of the Sherman and Clayton
Acts is whether the restraints of trade at issue will have a direct, substantial, and foreseeable effect
on U.S. commerce. Empagran SA v. E Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., 546 U.S. 1092 (2006); Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). The relevant antitrust statute is the Foreign Trade
Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C. § 6A (2006).
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within China, and not that multiple parties transact Chinese business.
Therefore, the language can be construed as triggering the filing
requirement if the minimum RMB nexus is satisfied by fewer than "all"
of the undertakings, including a sole undertaking. If this is the meaning
of the section, then, as in article 2(i), discussed above, the transaction at
issue may not necessarily affect competition in China.'38 It would be
helpful if this section were clarified to indicate whether or not the intent
was to capture transactions involving multiple firms, all having
significant turnover in China as the reviewing nation.'39
Sections (iii) and (iv) of article 2 set thresholds for pre-merger
notification that are subjective and not expressed in the objectively
measurable terms of sections (i) and (ii).'"° Section (iii) provides that a
pre-merger notification must be filed when: "One undertaking involved
in the concentration has acquired more than ten undertakings in the
relevant industry by the way of mergeing [sic], obtaining the control, or
obtaining the power to impose influence on decisive [sic] within the
territory of China within one year."'
4'
This section may have been based on the substantive concern that a
trend towards concentration in a relevant market may undermine
competition, as found in the tradition of the legislative history of
American merger law,4 2 which found expression in the language of
section 7 of the Clayton Act itself, prohibiting mergers that "may tend" to
restrain competition or "tend" to create a monopoly. Following the
legislative history, early substantive interpretation, as reflected in
138. If only one party to the merger met the RMB threshold while the turnover of all of the
others was not "within the territory of China," then the transaction would simply change the
corporate structure of the firm undertaking with turnover in China, but not affect competition.
Substituting one firm for another is relevant for corporate and securities law issues, but does not
increase the concentration within a market.
139. The American Chamber of Commerce of the People's Republic of China (AmCham-
China) identified this issue in its comments, filed with the State Council on February 27, 2008
(on file with author).
140. STATE COUNCtL OF THE P.R.C., supra note 123, art. 2(iii).
141. Id art. 2(i)-(ii).
142. The Supreme Court summarized the legislative history: first "was a fear of what was
considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy." In addition,
government studies reported on concentration and these were
cited as evidence of the danger to the American economy in unchecked corporate
expansions through mergers. Other considerations cited ... were the desirability of
retaining "local control" over industry and the protection of small businesses.
Throughout the recorded discussions may be found examples of Congress' fear not
only of accelerated concentration of economic power on economic grounds, but also of
the threat to other values a trend toward concentration was thought to pose.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962).
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reported cases, also emphasized the goal of merger enforcement as
halting a trend towards concentration in economic sectors of the
economy.'43 However, in the United States, this concern about trends
towards concentration was expressed in the context of the determination
of whether a particular transaction likely would restrain competition.
The American and European pre-merger notification regimes eschew
importing substantive standards into the requirement of pre-merger
notification.
Thus, the assumed concern of the State Council about a potential
rising tide of concentration is well within the historic mainstream of
antitrust law. However, the majority of modem substantive analysis is
focused on the economic impact of mergers and relegates consideration
of noneconomic factors to the realm of prosecutorial discretion and case
selection. Moreover, bringing the "trend towards concentration" into a
merger notification threshold represents a novel approach to the issue. In
evaluating the approach, commentators suggested that substantive
merger review would more appropriately be performed in a later stage,
after a potential transaction had been notified and during the
investigation of the proposed merger.l" This recommendation has the
merit of maintaining the notification rules as uncomplicated as possible,
while still recognizing the option of the reviewing agency to adopt and
enforce appropriate substantive standards to evaluate a particular merger.
In addition, limiting the notification thresholds to objectively verifiable
criteria makes it more efficient for undertakings to, first, determine
whether their transaction is reportable and, second, make the notification
in a prompt and cost-effective manner.
The fourth threshold, article 2(iv), is a similarly substantive standard
rather than one based on plain objective criteria. Section (iv) provides
that notification must be made when "[t]he concentration will lead one
undertaking involved in the transaction to have a market share of not less
than 25% of the market within the territory of China."' 4 5 This threshold
may draw upon the generally recognized view that excessive
143. See, e.g., N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 307-28 (1904) (expressing
concern that the result of the merger would be that "the entire commerce of the immense territory
in the northern part of the United States between the Great Lakes and the Pacific at Puget Sound
will be at the mercy of a single holding corporation, organized in a state distant from the people
of that territory"); Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315 ("The dominant theme pervading
congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered to be a
rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.").
144. See AmCham-China, supra note 139; SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF
INT'L LAW, supra note 87.
145. STATECOUNCLOFTHEP.R.C., supra note 123, art. 2(iv).
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concentration may give a firm market power to raise prices and restrict
output. '  The substantive merger Guidelines of the United States
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, as well as the
Guidelines of the European Commission, use measures of concentration
as the starting point to evaluate whether or not a merger should be
challenged or prohibited; however, proof of a particular share of a
relevant market is important but insufficient evidence that a merger likely
will harm competition.' 7
Next, the Guidelines provide that the Anti-Monopoly Authority may
require that the parties to a proposed merger file a pre-merger
notification even if the transaction does not meet the stated thresholds.
The standard for such an extra-threshold demand is whether "the
reviewing authority ... is reasonably of the opinion that the
concentration of undertakings may result in elimination or restriction of
competition."'48  One may reasonably presume that the authors of the
draft Guidelines were concerned that a merger of anticompetitive
significance might be below the thresholds for filing pretransaction
notification. Clearly, such a consideration is not purely hypothetical for
several reasons. First, the AML is the first antitrust law of general
application in China, and the authors of the Guidelines have no prior
experience with the task of establishing appropriate notification
thresholds. In addition, the Chinese economy is growing rapidly, so there
may have been a concern that the thresholds would become outdated
before they could be amended to reflect change in economic
circumstances.149 Finally, China is geographically vast and there are
potentially many small, isolated geographic markets beyond the reach of
rapid transportation of products and services where a merger below the
filing thresholds could give rise to market power that would not be
ameliorated by entry or arbitrage. These concerns are valid; however, the
need to adopt guidelines that are transparent and predictable to the
146. However, it should be stressed that, although market share and total concentration is
relevant to a determination of market power, it is not decisive. See United States v. Phila. Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (holding that a merger is presumptively illegal upon proof of high and
increased market share). But see United States v. Gen. Dynamics, Inc., 415 U.S. 486 (1974)
(cautioning that market share data may not necessarily represent the actual, or predicted future,
market power of a firm). In addition, facts relevant to a particular industry or market, such as
easy entry, may also belie the assumption of power implied by apparently overwhelming market
share. See, e.g., United States v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 743 F2d 976 (2d Cir. 1984).
147. See U.S. DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6, at 17; ECHorizontal
Merger Guidelines, supra note 58, paras. 15-17.
148. STATE COUNCIL OF THE PR.C., supr note 123, art. 2.
149. See OECD, Country Statistical Profile 2009-China, http://stats.oecd.org/viewhtml.
aspx?queryname= 18182&querytype=view&lang--en (last visited Oct. 31,2009).
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undertakings that will be obligated to follow them is also a valid
consideration. The Guidelines contain another section that permits the
Anti-Monopoly Authority to adjust the thresholds as circumstances
require.5 This flexibility should allow the Authority to carefully monitor
both the economy and the notifications filed and to make adjustments to
the thresholds as appropriate. Moreover, the notification Guidelines are
just that, requirements of pre-merger notification. The AML does not
immunize a merger that falls below the thresholds and is therefore not
required to be reported. Quite the contrary: while the AML is silent on
this subject, the rule in other jurisdictions is that an anticompetitive
merger violates the antitrust laws and may be challenged, even after the
merger has been consummated.'5'
An additional issue that is inherent in the anticipated operation of
the Guidelines is the process that can trigger a nonthreshold filing. The
section provides a nonexclusive list of potential complainants, including
competing undertakings or industrial associations. Any of these are
explicitly authorized, and even encouraged, to request that the Anti-
Monopoly Authority demand a pre-merger filing from merging firms
and to institute a review. Although other participants in a relevant market
are likely to be experienced in market conditions, they may also have
anticompetitive motives in seeking to block a merger of their
competitors. If a proposed merger is likely to increase efficiency and
competition, thus putting downward pressure on prices, other firms in the
market will be forced to compete or lose market share. These
competitors may choose to try to recruit the Anti-Monopoly Authority to
hobble their potential strongest competitors rather than compete on the
merits." '
Other important questions raised by this section concern what
precise criteria shall be used to make the demand for a below-threshold
notification. While the Authority must hold a good faith belief that the
potential merger could harm competition, the standard in the Guidelines
language is imprecise. On the one hand, the Guidelines suggest that such
150. STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., supranote 123, art. 3.
151. Evanston Nw. Healthcare Corp., ET.C. Docket 9315 (FTC Apr. 28, 2004), 2008 WL
1991995, at *1; Chi. Bridge & Iron, FT.C. Docket 9300 (FTC Oct. 25, 2001), 2001 WL 1299008.
152. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977); Hosp. Corp.
of Am. v. FTC, 807 E2d 1381, 1391-92 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1038 (1987)
(Posner, J., writing for the majority) ("Hospital Corporation's most telling point is that the impetus
for the Commission's complaint came from a competitor .... The hospital that complained to the
Commission must have thought that the acquisitions would lead to lower rather than higher
prices-which would benefit consumers, and hence, under contemporary principles of antitrust
law, would support the view that the acquisitions were lawful.").
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investigations should be triggered only if the merger likely will eliminate
competition, presumably covering situations where the merger is to
monopoly. On the other, the Guidelines allow below-threshold filings to
be demanded if the merger likely would restrict competition. Although
this latter scenario is not defined, it clearly would catch mergers that do
not produce a monopoly or, potentially, a duopoly market. In addition,
there is no further limitation, for example, that competition must be
"substantially" restrained, as in the language of the U.S. merger statute.' 3
Addition of such qualifiers would improve the transparency of the
Guidelines, permit informed analysis by scholars and practitioners, and,
finally, facilitate compliance among affected firms. An alternative
resolution would be to authorize, as is recognized in the AML, local
enforcement agencies to be alert to potentially anticompetitive mergers
and require them to report concerns to the Anti-Monopoly Authority.
This way, the Authority would be in a position to monitor the state of
competition throughout the country, adjust the thresholds as necessary,
and institute an investigation of a pending transaction that falls below the
thresholds. Although this solution would not have the effect of a
mandatory delay of a potential merger, it is likely that undertakings
notified of an investigation would promptly consult with the Authority
even if the transaction fell below the thresholds. As a general matter,
more predictability counsels increased consultation.
The Guidelines specifically permit exemptions from the
notification requirement that were specified in the AML, but do not offer
further guidance on the procedure for obtaining an exemption.'54 Article
4 of the Guidelines also appears to deal with the issue of sequential
reviews by sector agencies. Because many important sectors are subject
to sector regulators, this is an important issue and it will be necessary to
resolve potential jurisdictional conflicts. The language in an unofficial
translation is imprecise, but it appears to establish the Competition
Authority as primary:
Pursuant to the relevant law(s), regulation(s), and/or rule(s), if a
concentration of undertakings is subject to approval of concerned
agency(s), such approval is subject to permission of the reviewing authority
of concentration of undertakings before approving the concentration by
relevant authorities. Concentration may be exempted from of [sic]
153. Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006).
154. Draft 1 Guidelines article 4 provides: "Concentration of undertakings satisfying
Article 22 of the AML may be exempted from filing the notification with the reviewing authority
of concentration of undertakin[g]s." STATE CoUNcIL OF THE P.R.C., supr note 123, art. 4.
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concentration of undertakings notification of concentration after approval
of the review authority of concentration of undertakings.55
Finally, article 3 permits the thresholds to be adjusted "according to
elements such as economic development, industry policy[,] and market
competition" with the approval of the State Council.'56 Adjustment of the
objective numerical thresholds comports with general practice'57 and the
consensus benchmarks of the International Competition Network.' The
suggestion that adjustments may be made to conform with economic
development and industrial policy are less clear and less clearly related to
competitive issues. To the extent that "economic development" could be
interpreted as suggesting protection of local firms in a market, this would
bring factors irrelevant to competition into the Guidelines. It could,
indeed, be inconsistent with the clearly expressed policy of the AML that
administrative monopolies should not abuse their power.9
In terms of process, the draft requires the filing party or parties to
submit the required information by a certain deadline'6 ° and to include a
Chinese translation.'6 ' The required information essentially describes a
complete modem economic analysis of the competitive effects of the
proposed merger:
In the notification materials, the illustration of the effects ... the
concentration of undertakings will impose on the competition in the
relevant market shall include the definition of the relevant market and the
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id.art. 3.
157. See U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6, at 16-17; EC
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supr note 58, para. 15.
158. ICN, supmnote 118, at 3-4.
159. Article 51 of the AML provides:
Where any administrative organ or an organization empowered by a law or
administrative regulation to administer public affairs abuses its administrative power to
eliminate or restrict competition, the superior authority thereof shall order it to make
correction and impose punishments on the directly liable person(s)-in-charge and other
directly liable persons. The Anti-Monopoly Authority may put forward suggestions on
legal handling to the relevant superior authority.
Where it is otherwise provided in a law or administrative regulation for the
handling [of] the organization empowered by a law or administrative regulation to
administer public affairs [that] abuses its administrative power to eliminate or restrict
competition, such provisions shall prevail.
Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 2007,
effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 68, art. 51 (PR.C.),
translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/
BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575,pdf.
160. STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., supra note 123, art. 7 (requiring that "the filing
materials shall be in Chinese").
161. Id
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basis for such a definition, the market shares of the undertakings and the
calculating basis, important business activities of the undertakings in the
relevant market, and the economic analysis of the concentration.'
62
While practitioner-commentators have criticized this requirement as
overly burdensome, particularly for transactions that clearly do not
threaten competition,' 63 the analytic goal is commendable from a
scholarly point of view. The inquiry described comports well with
modem economic analysis of the potential effects of proposed mergers.
It asks the appropriate questions and equally importantly, does not, on its
face, seek information targeted to issues unrelated to competition
including, for example, potential effects on local employment that have
properly been critiqued when utilized in domestic transactions.'"
The Anti-Monopoly Authority is required to act rapidly to review
the filing documents and inform the parties of any deficiencies within
three days of the filing.' 65  Because the article does not specify the
deadline in terms of "business days," the requirement could be
interpreted as referring to calendar days. While such speed would be
welcomed by firms eager to complete their transaction with as little delay
as possible,"6 it seems unrealistic, especially for a new agency at the
outset of its operations. Whatever the deadline chosen by the Authority,
it is appropriate to have the Authority notify the parties that their filing
was incomplete and demand supplementation. Failure to comply with
requests to supplement the record is deemed identical to failure to file
and carries penalties.' 67 Of more concern is the effect of supplementary
filings. The article appears to restart the thirty-day clock of the
preliminary review period from the date of supplementation of the filing.
Given the need for speed in some transactions, this apparent calculation
may be a burden on firms, and, in any case, should be clarified. If a
transaction is truly potentially problematic, the Authority has the option
of engaging in a second-stage investigation, as provided for in the
162. Idart. 6.
163. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L LAW, supa note 87 and
accompanying text; SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L LAW, supm note 103 and
accompanying text; AmCham-China, supra note 139 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Candy Merger ls Challenge4 N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 1993, at D10; Pittsburgh
Hospital Merger of UPMC, Mercy Okit PITTSBURGHCHANNEL.COM, Oct. 16, 2007, http://www.
thepittsburghchannel.com/money/14351000/detail.html.
165. STATECOUNCILOFTHEP.R.C., supm note 123, art. 8.
166. And, in fact, the AmCham-China comments praise this article. AmChain-China,
supa note 139.
167. The penalty for failure to file, incomplete or inaccurate filings, and submission of
false or inaccurate information is punishable under articles 48 and 52 of the AML. STATE
COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., supra note 123, art. 15.
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AML.1' 68  The Guidelines obligate filing parties to notify the Anti-
Monopoly Authority of any "substantial" change of facts with respect to
the transaction.
169
Since the AML became effective on August 1, 2008, antitrust law
and practice has been and will continue to be in the process of
development for some time. New government agencies are in the
process of being established to enforce the various provisions of the
AML, additional substantive and procedural guidelines will be drafted,
and expertise must be developed to implement the AML effectively. Pre-
merger review is the most time-sensitive of the substantive AML sections
and potentially may have an immediate effect on firms doing business in
multiple jurisdictions that lack experience in dealing with the Chinese
legal system. The Guidelines specifically permit firms to consult with
the Anti-Monopoly Authority before filing their pre-merger notification
to obtain more information about the process and requirements.'70 If this
voluntary process is prompt and transparent, it could give important
credibility to the new system of pre-merger review.
In accord with practice in other jurisdictions, the Guidelines
recognize that some proposed mergers may not raise any competitive
issues. In such cases, article 12 institutes a "fast track" review process,
requiring the Anti-Monopoly Authority to make a prompt decision not to
prohibit a proposed transaction and notify the filing parties even before
the "formal written notification" is made.'7' This is a useful provision,
recognizing that most transactions are either competitively neutral or pro-
competitive. In such cases, the parties should not be required to wait for
the expiration of the initial thirty-day period if the Authority has made a
thorough review and is satisfied that it will not lessen competition. This
section, by requiring prompt notice, appears to fulfill that expectation. It
is not entirely clear, however, whether the notice of termination is
sufficient or if the parties are required to wait until the thirty-day period
has run before closing the transaction.
Article 12 also recognizes that other proposed transactions may
require further investigation and appears to contemplate a notice-and-
hearing process to supplement the second investigatory phase described
in the AML.'72 This article does not establish a formal hearing process,
168. Id. art. 26.
169. Id. art. 9.
170. Id. art. 11.
171. Id. art. 12.
172, AML article 25 requires that the Enforcement Agency must conduct its preliminary
review within thirty days of receiving a complete pre-merger notification filing and then either
approve the transaction or notify the parties that it will conduct a further review. Anti-Monopoly
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nor refer to any other provisions of the Chinese administrative law
concerning hearings. However, it requires the agency to give the parties
to the transaction the opportunity to "make statements."'73  Other
"interested parties" are also to be afforded the chance to make statements
as part of this process."4 The article would be clarified if it explained the
administrative process in more detail for firms unfamiliar with Chinese
administrative law. Important questions to be answered include whether
the "statements" are to be filed in writing or made in oral testimony,
whether a hearing is contemplated and the procedure for any such
hearing, and whether or not such a hearing is conducted on the public
record.
Finally, the Guidelines recognize that protecting the confidentiality
of business secrets and establishing a professional agency are critical to
the reputation and success of the pre-merger review process. These
issues are divided among three separate sections of the Guidelines:
article 10 permits filing parties to designate and justify confidential
information in the notification papers, article 13 requires "[o]fficials of
the reviewing authority" to maintain confidentiality of business secrets
and information designated by the parties, and article 16 provides for
liability of "officials of the reviewing authority" who disclose any such
confidential information."5 Article 16 is a general duty of ethical
practice, creating liability for abuse of power, neglect of official duties,
and graft, in addition to disclosure of secret information.'76 The penalties
are potentially severe: officials are subject to criminal liability in
appropriate cases and administrative sanctions for lesser violations."'
Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1,
2008) 2007 STANDING CoMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 68 (P.R.C.), translation available at
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI -EN/Laws/GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P0200710125
33593599575.pdf. Failure to decide within the time limit constitutes nondisapproval. Id
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., supmrnote 123, arts. 10, 13, 16.




2. Revised Version 78
a. Process
The initial draft of the Pre-Merger Notification Guidelines,
discussed above, became generally available in early March 2008.'17 The
Notification Guidelines generated wide interest throughout the legal and
business communities, and comments were filed by the American Bar
Association Sections of Antitrust Law and International Law.' Largely
comprising technical considerations rather than scholarly commentary,
these comments focused on two areas: the timing issues, an especially
important issue for clients filing in more than one jurisdiction, and
consistency with the substantive standards of other jurisdictions,
including the definition of "control" and thresholds for notice.'8' The
State Council evidently took the expressed interest of the international
bar and scholars seriously, because it issued a formal Notice
(Solicitation), dated March 27, 2008, seeking comments on specific
issues that had been identified in the first draft; the Council subsequently
published a second set of Guidelines that contain important amendments
responsive to the filed comments. 2
b. Specific Issues Identified by the State Council
The first issue identified in the responses to the Solicitation of
Comments is the definition of "control," which is required to constitute a
merger, acquisition, or other "concentration." "Control" was required but
not defined by the AML, except in the negative by inference. Article 20
of the AML defines a "concentration" either as a merger or as the
acquisition of "control" over other firms either by acquisition of equities
or assets or by gaining power to "exert a decisive influence" over other
178. The revised version of the Guidelines, along with a Solicitation of Comments from
the State Council, which is used by this Article, was translated by Wilmer Hale, a global law firm
with an office in Beijing. E-mail from Lester Ross (June 23, 2008) (on file with author). It is
attached as Appendix E.
179. See Legislative Affairs Office, State Council of the P.R.C., Notice Concerning the
Solicitation of Public Opinions with Respect to the State Council Regulations on Notification of
Concentrations of Undertakings (Wilmer Hale trans., Mar. 27, 2008), available at http://www.
abanet.org/intlaw/springO8/materials/Hale-Concerning-Solicitation of Public-OpinionsWith_
Respect_toStateCouncilProvisions onNotification of Concentrations of_Undertakings.pdf.
180. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L LAW, supra note 103.
181. Id
182. See Legislative Affairs Office, supra note 179.
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firms by other means including contracts. 83 Comments were sought
concerning the new four-part definition of the term of art.'
84
The second key amendment, and subject of the call for comments,
concerned the thresholds for filing pre-merger notification. As discussed
above,'85 the original four thresholds adopted both an objective and
subjective test to trigger the filing requirement. The first two set
monetary standards, one based on worldwide turnover and the other
based on turnover within China. Both of these standards also included a
nexus requirement for turnover within China, but both based this China
connection on the business done by one or more firms involved in the
transaction, leaving the possibility that the turnover would be associated
with only one firm.'86 The second pair of thresholds were subjective,
triggered either by a trend towards concentration in the form of
acquisition of at least the firms in the industry in China in a year, or
acquisition of a twenty-five percent share of a relevant market.'87 The
new draft deleted the first of these subjective tests and retained the
market share test.' This draft also lowered the monetary turnover
thresholds, based on a study from the Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS).' 9 The CASS monograph benchmarked the new
standards on the notification thresholds in forty-eight countries as well as
China's 2007 per capita GDP.'9  The Solicitation reiterated that the
183. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 68,
ch. IV art. 20(1)-(3) (PR.C.), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/
GeneralLawsandRegulations/BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575.pdf.
184. Legislative Affairs Office, supra note 179, § 1.1.
185. See supr Part 11.B.1.
186. STATECOUNCILOFTHEP.R.C., supm note 123, art. 2(i)-(ii).
187. Id art. 2(iii)-(iv).
188. Id. art. 2.
189. See Legislative Affairs Office, supra note 179.
190. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) was founded in 1977 under the
authority of the State Council. Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, http://www.gov.cn/english/
2005-12/02/content_116009.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2009). Its mission is:
To promote research and to undertake and fulfill key state research projects in light of
China's national conditions, economic and social development strategies and the
trends; to organize academic exchange between the Academy and the foreign countries
... in accordance with relevant policies and guidelines of the CPC and of the country;
to provide information on academic and research forefront and on newly emerging
theories, and provide important research papers and policy suggestions to the CPC




thresholds will be adjusted based on market and other factors and notes
that other countries also adjust their notification thresholds.'9'
c. Discussion
There are a number of important differences between the initial
Draft and the Draft for Comment (Revised Draft). On the less important
end, the original eighteen articles have been reorganized and renumbered,
resulting in nineteen articles that are organized in a clearer, more orderly
fashion. Expanding from the bare-bones statement of purpose, the
Revised Draft states that its purpose is to "clarify norms and procedures"
and standardize the pre-merger notification process.'92 This signals a
theme running throughout the Revised Draft: the newer version clearly
responds to comments on the previous version, adopting some of the
suggestions, and makes reference to international benchmarks. This
apparent determination to participate more fully in the global antitrust
community may point to further transparency and movement in the
direction of international convergence on some issues.
New article 2 is directly responsive to commentary discussed
above'93 and adds new definitions of "concentration" and "control."
"Concentration" consistent with the same word used by the European
Commission, includes mergers, acquisition of assets or equity, and other
forms of nonpermanent agreements, including contracts that allow the
acquirer to "exercise determinative influence" over the other firm.'94
"Control" is defined to include the obtainment of at least fifty percent of
the equity or voteable assets or of a sufficient majority of the voting
rights to "actually dominate" or elect more than half of the board of
191. Legislative Affairs Office, supra note 179, § 1.2.
192. STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., REGULATIONS ON NOTIFICATION OF CONCENTRATION OF
UNDERTAKINGS (DRAFT FOR SOLICITATION OF OPINIONS) art. 1 (2008) (Wilmer Hale trans., on file
with author).
193. See supra Part ILI.B.2.a (discussing comments on failure to define control).
194. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 68,
art. 2(3) (PR.C.), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/GeneralLaws
andRegulations/BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575.pdf. This section is consistent with the
EC Merger Regulation, Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24) 1. Article 3(2) of this
regulation provides:
Control shall be constituted by rights, contracts or any other means which, either
separately or in combination and having regard to the considerations of fact or law
involved, confer the possibility of exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in
particular by ... rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the
composition, voting or decisions of the organs of an undertaking.
Id. art. 3(2).
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directors of the acquired firm.'95 These definitions are important
additions to the Guidelines and, by clarifying an area questioned by
counsel, likely will facilitate the filing of required notifications.
The most important amendment is the filing thresholds in
renumbered article 3.96 Two objective criteria remain, although the RMB
triggers are lowered from global turnover of Y12 billion to Y9 billion,'97
and China turnover from Y6 billion to Y1.7 billion.' 8 The section
promises that further guidance will be coming on calculation of
turnover. '99 These subsections also require that "at least two such
undertakings" in the transaction must have a minimum total nexus with
China, defined at Y300 million.
200
By requiring more than a single firm with turnover within China,
the new nexus requirement answers critical commentary on the first
Draft and may serve to ensure that the transaction actually affects
Chinese markets rather than merely working to change offshore
ownership. If this interpretation is correct, then further explanation or
practice may require that each of the (minimum of) two firms with
Chinese turnover do not have an insignificant turnover in the country.2 '
The third threshold is the twenty-five percent market share trigger, but
the other subjective trigger (that requires notification in markets where
there has been a trend towards concentration) has been eliminated. This
amendment is a positive change that moves the thresholds towards
objective criteria in accord with the global consensus.2"2 Clear standards
are likely to produce more reliable filings, because firms do not have to
interpret whether or not a notification is required and give the reviewing
Anti-Monopoly Authority a better understanding of merger activity in the
market. The use of subjective standards such as market power can then
more appropriately be considered as part of the substantive evaluation of
notifications that have been filed.
195. STATECOUNCILOFTHEP.R.C., supra note 192, art. 2.
196. The Revised Draft, article 6, reiterates article 22 of the AML, clarifying safe harbors
under which notifications are not required. Id. art. 6. This section is consistent with general
practice, providing that increases in ownership by majority owners and transactions involving
majority owned firms are not reportable.
197. Id. art. 3(l).
198. Id. art. 3(2).
199. See Council Regulation 139/2004 O.J. (L 24) 1. Such assistance would be consistent
with the EC Merger Regulation article 5, which comprehensively defines the calculation of
turnover, sources that should be considered, and alternatives that may be used to determine
whether a notification must be filed. Id. art. 5.
200. STATECOUNCILOFTHEP.R.C., supra note 192, art. 3.
201. See SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW & SECTION OF INT'L LAw, supra note 103.
202. SeeICN,supranote 118, at 29.
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The Revised Draft continues to authorize the Anti-Monopoly
Authority to require notifications from acquisitions that do not meet the
thresholds.23 The government agency must make the decision to require
underthreshold notifications based on the threat to competition.
Complaints from competitors and trade associations are no longer listed
as permissible justifications for this procedure. This provision does not
include direction about the timing or process of such notifications and
investigations. It is not specified, for example, whether transactions
captured by this provision will be required to wait until after the thirty-
day (or potentially full one-hundred-twenty-day) period of investigation
before concluding their agreement. The risks to small transactions of
unexpected merger investigations, with accompanying delay and
expense, could lead them to avoid doing business in China or otherwise
amend their plans to protect against unanticipated government oversight.
With practical experience, the Authority may be in a position to either
adjust the notification thresholds to catch problematic mergers under the
current levels, or delete this section as unproductive. Article 5 authorizes
the Anti-Monopoly Authority to propose amendments to the Guidelines,
but the State Council must approve any changes.2"
Article 7, clarifying former article 5, identifies the firms that must
file the required notification."°5 Firms are invited to consult with the
Chinese Anti-Monopoly Authority before filing to clarify any issues
about the notification or the process." In specifying that the
consultation must occur "prior to filing'" the section apparently
forecloses continuing consultation as the filing is prepared for the
Authority or the preliminary investigation proceeds. The agency may be
appropriately sensitive about any appearance of impropriety, but it could
be useful for firms and Authority staff to be able to have an ongoing
dialogue during the process. Firms would be able to provide the
information needed to answer any questions about the transaction, and
the government personnel could solve any misunderstandings about the
requirements of the law.
Indeed, article 9, in listing the required elements of the notification
materials, likely will generate questions from undertakings unfamiliar
with the AML and legal procedure in China. This section amends and
203. STATECOUNCILOFTHEPR.C., supm note 192, art. 4.
204. Id. art. 5. It should be noted that timeliness in promulgating Guidelines, along with
opportunities to review and comment on proposed changes, will be valuable for firms subject to
the AML.
205. Id. art. 7. All firms must file the notification jointly if the transaction is a merger,
while the acquiring firm in other transactions has the duty to file.
206. Id. art. 8. This article is essentially identical to article 11 of the first Draft Guidelines.
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seeks to clarify article 6 of the first draft Guidelines, listing particular
information that must be produced. Some of the required information is
objective,"' and other documentation requests a discussion of market
definition and the competitive effects of the proposed transaction."'
Notifications that meet the thresholds are mandatory, and the penalties
for failure to file are specified in AML article 48. These penalties
include an injunction to halt any implementation of the transaction,
dissolution, and fines of up to Y500,000.2 °' The documents and materials
filed must be complete and accurate. Article 10 also requires, consistent
with the first Draft, that all of the "documents and materials" must be in
Chinese.21°
Incomplete notifications are deemed null and must be fully
supplemented within a deadline specified by the Anti-Monopoly
Authority."1 ' A big incentive to make the original notification complete is
built into the article, which provides that "the time limit for an initial
review[, that is, thirty days] ... shall be calculated from the date of
receipt of all documents and materials." ' Thus, apparently the clock is
stopped and begins to run from zero if the original notification is
defective. Similarly, if there is a "material change" in the transaction, the
parties must notify the government agency. In a new provision of this
article, the time period for reviewing the transaction "shall be calculated
from the date of receipt by the anti-monopoly authority under the State
Council of all materials evidencing the change of facts."'
A preliminary investigation period can take up to thirty days from
the filing of the complete notification materials, followed by a second-
phase investigation of up to ninety days, and may be extended for another
sixty days,2"4 for a total maximum of five months. The drafters of the
207. See, e.g., id. art. (3) (concerning concentration agreements); id art. 9(4) (requiring
audited financial reports and names and addresses of the relevant undertakings).
208. Id. art. 9(2).
209. Id art. 16 (amending First Draft art. 15). The original draft included penalties under
AML articles 48 and 52, which include fines up to 1 million and potential criminal penalties.
210. Id. art. 10.
211. Id. art. 11. The Revised Draft requires the Enforcement agency to inform the parties
of any defect in their filing. Unlike the coordinating section in the first Draft requiring agency
action within three days, the agency must act in a "timely" manner to make a preliminary review
of the notification materials and inform the party that the notification is incomplete.
212. Id
213. Id art. 12.
214. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAZ. 68,
art. 25 (PR.C.), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI EN/Laws/GeneralLaws
andRegulations/BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575.pdf (thirty-day preliminary review); id
art. 26 (ninety-day second phase investigation, potential sixty-day extension).
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Revised Draft, however, recognize that extended, second-phase
investigations are not required to approve most mergers and that many
transactions can be cleared before the expiration of the preliminary
deadline."5 Therefore, Revised Draft article 14 expands and clarifies
former article 12 by requiring the Anti-Monopoly Authority to create and
use an expedited review process with the goal of making early decisions
as often as possible.
The Revised Draft omits the guarantee that parties (and third
parties) would be permitted to make statements and provide information
during the preliminary investigation."' It would be beneficial if this
process were included in the anticipated "expedited initial review
mechanism" because openness and transparency of the process would
only benefit the parties to the transaction, who could respond to issues
and to the Anti-Monopoly Authority, whose staff likely will be laboring
to resolve notifications with appropriate speed. The Authority is required
to make a written notice to the parties, informing them of the early
termination decision and allowing them to proceed with the
concentration. The Revised Draft does not require the notification to be
published or made available to the public. The ICN international
benchmarks recommend, and US. and EC enforcement agencies in
practice publish, notice of early terminations.2 7 This information from
the Chinese Authority would likely be of assistance to firms and counsel
seeking to learn and master practice under the AML. The positive early
termination process mitigates the potentially long period during which a
transaction could be unresolved and is well within the mainstream of
jurisdictions that have adopted an early termination process. It remains
to be seen in practice what percentage of notifications receive early
clearance or undergo second-phase investigations, and how many are
actually prohibited.
Additionally, the Revised Draft collects and clarifies several
disparate provisions on confidentiality."8 Reporting firms may designate
their pre-merger notification as confidential and may be required to
215. 2008 Solicitation, supra note 182, at 1.3(6).
216. Compare STATE COUNCIL OF THE P.R.C., supra note 192, art. 14, with STATE COUNCIL
OFTREP.R.C., supmnote 123, art. 12.
217. ICN, supranote 118, at7-9.
218. STATE COUNCIL OF THE PR.C., supra note 192, art. 13. Article 13 is based on First
Draft articles 10 (firms may designate information contained in the notification as confidential
and shall justify the claim) and 13 (government agency officials required to maintain
confidentiality of designated information and business secrets disclosed during prefiling
consultations). The liability sections, Revised Draft article 17 and First Draft article 16, remain
separate because they cover violations for official corruption and neglect of duties as well as for
disclosure of business secrets or confidential material.
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submit a nonsecret summary of the information." ' In a new provision,
the Anti-Monopoly Authority is not bound by the designation unless it
decides that the need for secrecy is reasonable."' The Draft does not
provide for consultation or negotiation before the agency makes its
decision, but the process would be benefitted by such transparency and
openness. The government agency and staff have a legal obligation to
maintain confidentiality with respect to both the materials designated by
the parties and trade secrets disclosed during the optional consultation
before filing. This requirement will force the agency to maintain
excellent records to ensure that confidential information, whenever
obtained, is protected.
Finally, the Revised Draft promises further Guidelines, to be written
by the antimonopoly commission of the State Council.221
3. Final Notification Thresholds
The AML became fully effective on August 1, 2008. The final
Notification Thresholds were adopted by the State Council on the same
day, and became effective as of their date of promulgation.2 2 This final
version as promulgated is significantly abbreviated; therefore, the new
title "Notification Thresholds" is a more accurate description than the
more ambiguous Pre-Merger Notification Guidelines discussed above.
The Notification Thresholds comprise five articles, three of which are
substantive. Article 1 states that the document is promulgated in accord
with the AMIL and with the purpose of clarifying the thresholds for pre-
merger filings.2 3  Article 5 confirms that the Thresholds become
effective on August 1, 2008, the date of promulgation by the State
Council. 24  Article 2 defines "concentration," but has retreated
completely from the efforts of the prior drafts to define "control."25 This
article simply reproduces AML article 20, so it serves as an introduction
to the substantive thresholds for notification rather than a new
219. Article 13 of the Revised Draft states "Undertakings may request the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority under the State Council to maintain all submitted documents and materials
in confidence ...." Id. art. 13. This may be an inaccurate translation, because it would be
preferable for the designation to protect only genuinely confidential materials.
220. Id.
221. Idart. 18.
222. Rules of the State Council on Notification Thresholds for Concentrations of
Undertakings (promulgated by the State Council of the PR.C., Aug. 1, 2008, effective Aug. 1,
2008) Decree of the State Council of the P.R.C. no. 529 (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, trans.)
(on file with author).
223. Id. art. 1.
224. Id. art. 5.
225. Id. art. 2.
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substantive contribution. Articles 3 and 4, then, are the new regulations
of the merits, and these amendments are genuinely important.226 The first
significant amendment was the deletion of the market share threshold,
leaving only two controlling thresholds, both of which set out objective
tests. These notification thresholds are now limited to objective criteria
of global turnover and turnover within China. The actual RMB amounts
were raised, apparently based on international benchmarks.222 Also
improved is the requirement of PRC contacts for both thresholds. The
prior draft thresholds had required "at least two of such undertakings" to
have a minimum turnover within China. This language admitted the
possibility of an interpretation that would require pre-merger notification
from merging firms in which one had PRC turnover of Y299.9 million
and another had PRC turnover of¥Y100,000. The final Thresholds require
PRC turnover of "at least each of two undertakings" over Y400 million.
Thus, the PRC contacts of two of the firms must be more than merely de
minimis. The important news is in the decision to adopt strictly objective
standards. As enacted, the final subjective threshold, which had required
a party to possess twenty-five percent of the relevant market in China,
has been eliminated. This decisive turn to objective thresholds is in
accord with the international trend, as discussed above, as well as with
international benchmarks, and represents the least ambiguous method to
trigger the pre-merger review process.
The second major change is found in new article 4, dealing with
mergers below the notification thresholds.2 8 Prior drafts had permitted
the enforcement agency to require a pre-merger notification and follow
the other Draft procedures, including the potential for extended review
and mandatory delay until after investigation in such situations. The new
article simply gives the agency the power to investigate transactions
below the thresholds. However, there is no indication that such
transactions would be delayed during these investigations. This highly
salutary development gives far more predictability and stability to the
pre-merger review process in China.
On the less positive side, all of the prior articles have been deleted.
While improvements could always be made, several features of the
226. Id arts. 34.
227. Threshold 1 requires a total worldwide turnover of "all undertakings to the
concentration" of Y10 million (raised from Y9 million) with PRC turnover of "each of two
undertakings" of Y400 million (raised from Y300 million). Id. art. 3. Threshold 2 requires PRC
turnover of all of the "undertakings to the concentration" of Y2.0 billion (raised from Y1.7 billion)
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previous draft were instrumental to the smooth functioning of a system
of notification and review: the definition of "control" objective
thresholds that trigger the duty to file, a clear list of information required
to be submitted,229 the review process including procedures for early
termination, confidentiality provisions and procedures for designating
particular materials and information as confidential, and penalties.
IV INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKNG
The Solicitation of Comments cites with approval various
international experiences and practices in pre-merger notification and
review. The most comprehensive collection of these standards and
recommended procedures is found in the work of the ICN."3° In 2002, the
ICN disseminated an eight-point set of Guiding Principles for Merger
Notification and Review, which identifies respect for sovereignty,
transparency, nondiscrimination, procedural fairness, appropriate review,
coordination, convergence, and protection of confidential information as
fundamental precepts.23' The Revised Draft evidently has taken these
principles into consideration and makes important efforts to recognize
and apply many of them.
V QUESTIONS AND ISSUES
The substantive analysis used in reviewing prospective mergers is of
critical importance to the academic, legal, and corporate communities.
In the first instance, substantive guidelines describing the methodology
and analytic approach of the enforcement agency would be a useful first
step in China's entry into the world of merger review. Though
concentrations and mergers have been subject to some legal review under
preexisting Chinese law, the AML is a clean slate and the views and
priorities of the enforcement entities are unknown and unpredictable.
The legal standards may accrete over time if the relevant agencies publish
their decisions and underlying analyses. Nevertheless, guidelines
promulgating the substantive standards, even if amended as the agency
229. Alternatively, a form document would be a workable alternative. See, e.g., 16 C.ER.
§ 803 app. (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/hsrlP989316PMNRulesandFormal
InterpretationsElectronicSubmissionofForns-Form.pdf.
230. Since 2002, the ICN Merger Working Group has been working on guidelines and
benchmarks, and has published a thirty-seven-page, multipoint set of Recommended Practices for
the notification process. See ICN, supra note 118. These particular recommendations have been
discussed throughout this Article wherever relevant.
231. INT'L CoMPEIION NETwORK (ICN), GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR MERGER NOTIFICATION




develops expertise, would be an important foundation for further
consultation and learning. It is not necessary that every jurisdiction
adopt identical substantive merger standards, and this Article does not
insist that the Chinese Merger Guidelines simply translate the U.S. or
European guidelines on the subject, but transparency is a fundamental
consideration for firms that choose to compete in multiple jurisdictions.
Harmony is a value beyond clarity. Harmonization of the
substantive legal rules is doubtless important to firms engaged in global
competition, but it is a nontrivial step beyond simple transparency.
Nations at different stages of economic development may encounter
different issues and challenges as they move beyond state control and
towards a market economy. The Chinese economy has been undergoing
a process of "reform and opening up" '232 for the past thirty years, but still
has numerous sectors controlled by state owned enterprises (SOEs).233
Therefore, acquisitions may increase both concentration and market
competition, and may be predicted to be pro-competitive. In industries
with large SOE presence, a transaction that creates a large, or even a very
large, private competitor may be pro-competitive, while that would not be
the case in a longstanding market economy with few publicly controlled
entities. On this basis, therefore, the traditional Herfindahl-Hirschmann
Index (HHI) levels may imperfectly forecast competitive risk and trigger
challenges to highly beneficial transactions. Additionally, modem
economic tests, including the HH123 and Small but Significant and
Nontransitory Increase in Price (SSNIP),"5 may not be useful to an
agency in its initial stages of organization or to an economy transitioning
towards market principles and, as the AML states, "promoting the healthy
development of socialist market economy."'36 Even more problematic,
232. Lieberthal, supra note 122, at 127 (describing the reform era beginning in the late
1970s with Deng Xiaoping's policies and the third plenary session of the eleventh central
committee of the CCP).
233. Id.
234. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index is the standard measure of market power. SeeThe
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/testimony/hhi.htm (last visited
Nov. 6, 2009).
235. SSNIP is used by the U.S. DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines as the test for a
relevant market. See U.S. DOJ/FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, supra note 6, at 16-17. The
relevant inquiry is whether, in the instance of a small but significant and nontransitory increase in
prices, approximately five percent for the foreseeable future (SSNIP), the buyer would turn to
another substitute product. See Oysttein Daljord et al., The SSNIP Test and Market Definition
with the Aggregate Diversion Ratio: A Reply to Katz & Shapiro, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON.
263, 263-64 (2008). Any acceptable substitutes would be added to the relevant market definition
and the test would be repeated until the buyer accepted no more substitutes. Id. at 264.
236. Anti-Monopoly Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong.,
Aug. 31, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) 2007 STANDING COMM. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 68,
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the backward-looking test promulgated by the National Association of
Attorneys General (NAAG) 37 is of little utility in an economy where
there has been little competition in the past.
At a minimum, a neutral observer would recommend that the new
enforcement agency strive to articulate and promulgate its substantive
standards and procedural requirements, disseminating them to the widest
possible audience. A conscientious, deliberative process promotes
serious consideration of the issues analysis of international benchmarks
and various national merger policies. Whether or not the agency
deliberation takes place internally or invites outside commentary, the
exercise of articulating principles and standards is salutary.
Finally, wide dissemination of the standards and procedures
maximizes transparency and provides guidance and direction to scholars
and the subjects of regulation. Further transparency would include
statistics identifying the number of pre-merger notifications filed,
preliminary investigations opened, in-depth investigations conducted, and
challenges. These results would provide a minimum level of openness.
Beyond mere numbers, however, the agency could follow the European
practice of providing a written explanation of its decision on each
transaction reviewed. These decisions may be published in Chinese and,
to promote more understanding and compliance, in translation to English
and the language of the principal place of business of any foreign firm
participating in the acquisition.
art. 1 (PR.C.), translation available at http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDIEN/Laws/GeneralLawsand
Regulations/BasicLaws/P020071012533593599575.pdf.
237. NATIONAL ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN., HoIuzoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 9 (1993),
available at http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/at-hmergerguidelines.pdf. The methodology
for defining relevant product markets is stated as follows:
The Attorneys General will determine the customers who purchase the products or
services ("products") of the merging firms. Each product produced in common by the
merging parties will constitute a provisional product market. However, if a market is
incorrectly defined too narrowly, the merger may appear to be not horizontal when
there may be a horizontal anticompetitive effect in a broader market. In short, the
provisional product market will be expanded to include suitable substitutes for the
product which are comparably priced. A comparably priced substitute will be deemed
suitable and thereby expand the product market definition if, and only if, considered
suitable by customers accounting for seventy-five percent of the purchases.
Actual substitution by customers in the past will presumptively establish that a
product is considered a suitable substitute for the provisionally defined product.
However, other evidence offered by the parties probative of the assertion that customers





It has been clear for some time that international organizations-the
OECD, WTO, ICN, and United Nations-advocate strong national
competition policy and use the substance and deployment of national
antitrust law as an indicator of a state's place in the world. Competition
policy involves issues well beyond mergers, covering in addition hard
core horizontal cartels, benign horizontal agreements, vertical
distribution restraints, and monopolization or abuse of a dominant
market position. With the adoption of the AML, China joined a growing
number of jurisdictions that have adopted antitrust laws of general
application, but the test of the AML will be in its application. The
challenges facing new enforcement agencies are vast: organization,
establishing enforcement procedures that comport with the existing
Chinese legal system, allocating appropriate functions to the three
entities and coordinating process and substance, and finally, but most
important, setting policies and priorities. Given the choice of where to
begin enforcement, an agency should weigh the destructiveness of the
restraint, importance and ability to enforce, and its own proficiency or
readiness to enforce the particular category of violations.
On a relative scale of harm, there is overwhelming consensus that
horizontal cartels, which frequently cross national borders, are at the top
of the list.238 Beyond hard core horizontal cartels, however, jurisdictions
can and do differ in their approaches to other cooperative behavior, single
firm conduct, and concentrations. A discontinuity has been developing
on the effect of vertical restraints, with the United States taking an
increasingly benign view," and the European Union,24 Japan,241 and
others242 characterizing some vertical price agreements as hard core,
238. SeeICN, supranote 118, at 15.
239. Compare Cont'l T.V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977), and United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), andDr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons
Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), with Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877
(2007), andState Oil Co. of Cal. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
240. Article 4(a) of Regulation 2790/1999 identifies resale price maintenance as a hard
core restraint. Commission Regulation (EC) 2790/1999, art. 4(a), 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21; see
Cases C-56 & C-58/64, Consten & Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E.C.R. 299.
241. Japan Antimonopoly Act declares that vertical minimum price fixing is unlawful if it
has the tendency to hinder competition without a justification, unless exempted by the JFTC. Act
on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade, Act No. 54 of 1947,
arts. 2(9), 19, 23(2), translation available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/
amended-ama.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2009). Applied, the agency has taken a per se, rather than
broad-ranging rule of reason, approach. Mitsuo Matsushita, The Aninonopoly of Japan, in
GLOBAL COMPETITION POLICY 151, 188-90 (Edward M. Graham & David Richardson eds., 1997).
242. This includes other ICN members, such as Indonesia, India, and South Africa.
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nonexemptible restraints. Important differences in the legal framework4 3
have led different jurisdictions to adopt inconsistent standards on the
threshold of illegality for dominance or monopolization. Accordingly,
any state embarking on a competition enforcement project would be
advised to consider priorities and establish a hierarchy of enforcement
goals.
China chose to promulgate its first set of AML Guidelines on the
subject of pre-merger notification. On the one hand, since the AML
itself requires pre-merger notification but does not provide sufficient
information to comply, guidelines are needed. On the other hand, the
Commission or Agency could have paced its enforcement of
concentrations. The organizational structure of three entities with
separate responsibilities under the AIL may complicate the priority-
setting process and set up incentives for maximum activity by each as it
competes for position. Additionally, given China's historic rapid
economic growth and pace of mergers, including foreign investments,
there may have been a need to assert enforcement power in this arena
early.
Retrospectively, the experience of the AML and Guideline process
has revealed notable receptivity to international commentary on the
substance and procedure of merger review. The now-adopted
Notification Guidelines went through several public drafts, and
comments were affirmatively solicited from "all sectors of society,"
including domestic and foreign scholars and lawyers.'" Even more
important, some of the amendments in the second draft are consistent
with some of the comments filed by foreign counsel. Indeed the
Solicitation of Comments refers to and justifies some of the proposed
amendments based on a global consensus of antitrust enforcement
agencies worldwide. 5
243. Compare, for example, the U.S. rule on monopoly, requiring market shares of at least
seventy percent for illegality, with EU standards on abuse of dominance, which have historically
raised competitive concerns at significantly lower market shares, including, rarely, market shares
under fifty percent.
244. 2008 Solicitation, supra note 182.
245. The Chinese AML was not yet effective as of the ICN Spring 2008 meeting in Kyoto,
and neither the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Commission nor the Enforcement Agency were members
of the International Competition Network, which is limited to government antitrust enforcement
agencies. However, a professor of law at CASS attended and made a presentation on the AML. It
should be noted that the ICN members are the national agencies responsible for enforcing the
relevant antitrust laws, not the respective sovereign states, so there are a variety of precedents that
would enable the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Commission, Enforcement Agency, or other relevant
agencies to participate in ICN. For example, the State Council of the People's Republic of China,
Taiwan Affairs Office:
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In a different system, reviewing proposed mergers, including pre-
merger notification, may not be an obvious first step for a new
competition agency implementing a new antitrust law. However, the
enforcement mechanism in China will involve three different government
ministries, each responsible for enforcing different segments of the AML.
The State Administration of Industry and Commerce will be responsible
for enforcing the provisions against abuse of dominant positions, the
National Development and Reform Commission will be entrusted with
anticartel enforcement, and the Ministry of Commerce will have
jurisdiction over the merger review provisions of the AML."6
MOFCOM has already begun to issue additional draft Guidelines
and review proposed mergers.247 Emerging from a lengthy drafting
process, the operative agencies appear to be moving with alacrity. Going
forward, clarity, transparency, and predictability would be recommended
in the refinement of the notification procedures and promulgation of
substantive merger standards. The AMEL is indeterminate, and judicial
interpretation is unavailable, so a clear articulation of the appropriate
methodology and controlling legal standard is an unfinished project.
Finally, it must be observed that the process has been marked by
impressive transparency and consideration of views from parties that will
be affected by the merger review process. Viewing the various official
drafts and public comments suggests that some of the recommendations
On the basis of the principle of one China, the Chinese Government has made
arrangements for Taiwan's participation in some inter-governmental international
organizations which accept regional membership in an agreeable and acceptable way
according to the nature, regulations and actual conditions of these international
organizations. As a region of China, Taiwan has participated in the Asian Development
Bank (ADB) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), respectively, under
the names "Taipei, China" and "Chinese Taipei." In September 1992, the chairman of
the council of the predecessor of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATI'), stated that Taiwan may participate in this
organization as "a separate Taiwan-Penghu-Jinmen-Mazu tariff zone" (abbreviated as
Chinese Taipei) after the PRC's entry into GATT. The WTO should persist in the
principle defined in the afore-said statement when examining the acceptance of
Taiwan's entry into the organization. This is only an ad hoc arrangement and cannot
constitute a model applicable to other inter-governmental international organizations or
international gatherings.
Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, http://www.gwytb.gov.cn:8088/detail.asp?table=
WhitePaper&title=White%20Papers%20On%20Taiwan%20Issue&mid=4 (last visited Oct. 31,
2009).
246. Interview with Shang Ming, supra note 66, at 1; Zhu, supra note 84.
247. Interview with Shang Ming, supra note 66, at 1. Since its inception, MOFCOM
reviewed two proposed transactions: InBev N.V/S/A.-Anheuser-Busch Co. and Coca Cola
Co-China Huiyuan Juice Group Ltd., approving the former with additional commitments and
rejecting the latter. Id
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were adopted. Additionally, the Solicitation itself refers to the consensus-
based international benchmarks of the ICN and asserts consistency with
international standards. The application of the AMIL Notification
Guidelines and additional Guidelines continues to be a work in
progress."'
248. Other draft guidelines were issued after promulgation of the Notification Guidelines
and are pending. See, for example, Guidelines for Definition of Relevant Market (Drat)
(promulgated by the Anti-Monopoly Comm'n of the State Council, Jan. 5, 2009), Provisional
Measures on the Review of Concentrations Between Undertakings, Provisional Measures on the
Collection of Evidence for Suspected Monopolistic Concentrations Between Undertakings Not
Reaching the Notification Thresholds, Provisional Measures on the Investigation and Handling of
Concentations Between Undertakings Not Notdfied in Accordance with the Law, and Provisional




ANTI-MONOPOLY LAW OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(Wilmer Hale, trans.)
Order of the Chairman of the People's Republic of China No. 68
The Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China was
adopted by the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth
Session of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of
China on August 30, 2007. It is now promulgated and shall enter into
force from August 1, 2008.
Chairman of the People's Republic of China Hu Jintao
August 30, 2007
Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China
(Adopted by the 29th meeting of the Standing Committee of the Tenth
Session of the National People's Congress of the People's Republic of
China on August 30, 2007)
Chapter I General Principles
Article 1 This Law is enacted for the purposes of preventing and
prohibiting monopolistic conduct, protecting fair market competition,
improving economic operating efficiency, safeguarding the legitimate
interests of consumers and societal and public interests, and enhancing
the healthy development of the socialist market economy.
Article 2 This Law is applicable to monopoly conduct in economic
activities within the territory of the People's Republic of China.
This Law is applicable to monopoly conduct outside the territory of
the People's Republic of China that eliminates or has a restrictive effect
on competition in the domestic market of the People's Republic of China.
Article 3 Monopoly conduct as referred into this Law shall include:
(1) Monopoly agreements among undertakings;
(2) Abuse of dominant market positions by undertakings;
2009]
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(3) Concentrations of undertakings that have an eliminating or
restrictive effect or may have an eliminating or restrictive
effect on competition.
Article 4 The State [central government] will formulate and
implement competition rules in line with the socialist market economy,
perfect macro-adjustment, and refine the unified, open, competitive and
orderly market system.
Article 5 Undertakings may conduct concentrations, expand
operating scale and enhance market competitiveness in accordance with
law through fair competition and voluntary cooperation.
Article 6 Any undertaking with a dominant market position may not
abuse a dominant market position to eliminate or restrict competition.
Article 7 The State shall grant protection to a legal operating
activities of undertakings in industries in which the State-owned
economy occupies a controlling position and which relate to the national
economy and state security and in industries in which exclusive
operations and exclusive sales are conducted in accordance with law, and
shall supervise and regulate the operating activities of such undertakings
and the prices of their commodities and services in accordance with law
to protect the interests of consumers and advance technological progress.
Undertakings in industries in the preceding paragraph shall conduct
legal operations in good faith and perform strict self-discipline, accept
public supervision and shall not take advantage of their controlling
positions or exclusive operating or sales positions to harm the interests of
consumers.
Article 8 Administrative authorities and organizations authorized by
law or regulation to administer public affairs may not abuse
administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition.
Article 9 The State Council shall establish an anti-monopoly
commission to be responsible for organization, coordination and
guidance of anti-monopoly work, including the following functions and
duties:
(1) research and propose relevant competition policies;
(2) organize investigations and appraisals of overall market
competition conditions and issue appraisal reports;
(3) formulate and publish anti-monopoly guidelines;
[Vol. 18
CHINESE MERGER GUIDELINES
(4) coordinate enforcement of anti-monopoly administrative
regulations;
(5) such other duties as provided by the State Council.
The composition and working rules of the anti-monopoly
commission of the State Council shall be provided by the State Council.
Article 10 The anti-monopoly authority undertaking the duty of
enforcement of anti-monopoly regulation as provided by the State
Council shall be responsible for the enforcement of anti-monopoly
regulation work in accordance with the provisions of this Law.
The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
may in accordance with work requirements authorize competent
departments in each province, autonomous region and municipality
directly under the central government to be responsible for relevant
enforcement of anti-monopoly regulation in accordance with this Law.
Article 11 Industry associations shall strengthen industry self-
discipline, guide undertakings in the industry to conduct competition in
accordance with law, and safeguard market competition order.
Article 12 "Undertaking" in this Law refers to any natural person,
legal person or other organization that engages in the manufacture and
transaction of commodities or provision of services.
"Relevant market" in this Law refers to the territorial area and scope
of commodities within which undertakings compete against each other
during a period or time for particular commodities or services
(hereinafter "commodities").
Chapter II Monopoly Agreements
Article 13 The following monopoly agreements among competing
undertakings shall be prohibited:
(1) fixing or changing prices of commodities;
(2) limiting the quantity of production or sale of commodities;
(3) dividing sales markets or raw materials procurement markets;
(4) limiting the purchase of new technology or new equipment,
or the development of new technology or new products;
(5) jointly boycotting transactions; and
(6) such other monopoly agreements as determined by the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council.
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"Monopoly agreement" referred to in this Law shall mean any
agreement, decision or concerted action that eliminates or restricts
competition.
Article 14 The following monopoly agreements between
undertakings and counterparties to a transaction shall be prohibited:
(1) fixing the prices of commodities to be resold to any third
party;
(2) fixing the minimum prices of commodities to be resold to
any third party;
(3) such other monopoly agreements as determined by the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council.
Article 15 Articles 13 and 14 of this Law shall not apply to any
agreement which an undertaking may prove has been reached for any of
the following purposes:
(1) upgrading technology, research and development of new
products;
(2) improving product quality, reducing costs and enhancing
efficiency, unifying product specifications, standards, or
engaging in a specialized division or work;
(3) improving operational efficiency of small- and medium-sized
enterprises and enhancing the competitiveness of small- and
medium-sized enterprises;
(4) achieving such societal and public interests as realization of
energy conservation, environmental protection and provision
of disaster relief and assistance;
(5) coping with economic depression by moderating material
decreases in sales quantities or obvious production surpluses;
(6) protecting proper interests of foreign trade and foreign-
related economic cooperation;
(7) such other circumstances as provided by law and the State
Council.
Under conditions in which Articles 13 and 14 do not apply to items
(1) through (5), the undertakings shall also prove that the agreement
reached will not materially limit competition in the relevant market and




Article 16 Industry associations may not organize undertakings in
the industry to engage in monopoly conduct prohibited under this
Chapter.
Chapter I1 Abuse of Dominant Market Position
Article 17 Undertakings with dominant market positions are
prohibited from engaging in any of the following abuses of dominant
market position activities:
(1) selling or buying commodities at unfairly high or low prices;
(2) without valid reason, selling commodities at prices below
cost;
(3) without valid reason, refusing to trade with another party to a
transaction;
(4) without valid reason, restricting the other party to a
transaction to trade only with itself or to trade only with other
undertakings which it designates;
(5) without valid reason, tying the sale of commodities or
providing any other unreasonable conditions to transactions;
(6) without valid reason, applying different prices or other
transaction terms to equally placed trading partners;
(7) such other abuses of dominant market position conduct as
recognized by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority
under the State Council.
Dominant market position in this Law means a market position in
which an undertaking is capable of controlling the price or quantity of
commodities or other trading conditions or preventing and/or affecting
other undertakings' market access in the relevant market.
Article 18 A dominant market position shall be determined based
on the following factors:
(1) market share of the undertaking in the relevant market and
competitive conditions in the relevant market;
(2) ability of the undertaking to control the sales market or raw
materials procurement market;
(3) financial and technological conditions of the undertaking;
(4) reliance of other undertakings on such undertaking with
respect to transactions;
(5) difficulty of access to the relevant market by other
undertakings;
2009]
TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP. LAW
(6) such other factors relevant to determination of a dominant
market position of such undertaking.
Article 19 In case of any of the following, the undertaking may be
considered to be in a dominant market position:
(1) the share of one undertaking in the relevant market has
reached 1/2;
(2) the joint shares of two undertakings in the relevant market
have reached 2/3;
(3) the joint shares of three undertakings in the relevant market
have reached 3/4.
Under items (2) and (3), if any undertaking has a market share of
less than 1/10, such undertaking shall not be considered to be in a
dominant market position.
For any undertaking deemed to be in a dominant market position, if
there is evidence proving that such undertaking is not in a dominant
market position, such undertaking shall then be deemed not to be in a
dominant market position.
Chapter IV Concentrations of Undertakings
Article 20 Concentrations of undertakings refer to the following
circumstances:
(1) merger of undertakings;
(2) obtaining control of other undertakings through acquisition
of equity interests or assets;
(3) obtaining control of or the capability to exercise
determinative influence over other undertakings by contract
or other means.
Article 21 Undertakings shall file an advance notification with the
anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council for
concentrations which reach the notification standards prescribed by the
State Council, and no concentration shall be implemented without
notification.
Article 22 Undertakings need not file notifications with the anti-




(1) one of the undertakings participating in the concentration
holds 50% or more of the voting rights of the equity interests
or assets of the other undertakings;
(2) 50% or more of the equity interests or assets with voting
rights of each undertaking participating in the concentration
are held by the same undertaking which is not participating in
the concentration.
Article 23 Undertakings which file a notification of a concentration
with the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
shall submit the following documents and materials:
(1) application;
(2) explanation of the concentration's effect on conditions of
competition in the relevant market;
(3) concentration agreement;
(4) financial and accounting reports of the undertakings
participating in the concentration for the preceding
accounting year, audited by a certified public accountant;
(5) such other documents and materials as required by the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council.
The application shall provide the names, domiciles, and scope of
business of the undertakings participating in the concentration as well as
the date of the concentration and such other matters as prescribed by the
anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council.
Article 24 If the documents and materials submitted in the
notification by the undertakings are incomplete, the undertakings
concerned shall supplement the relevant documents and materials within
the period prescribed by the anti-monopoly implementing authority
under the State Council. A notification shall be deemed as having never
been filed if the documents and materials are not supplemented within
the prescribed period.
Article 25 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council shall conduct an initial review and decide whether to initiate
further review and issue a written notice to the undertakings within 30
days from the date of receipt of the notification documents and materials
submitted by the undertakings (submitted in conformity with Article 23).
The undertakings may not implement the concentration until a decision
has been made by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the
State Council.
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If the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
does not decide to conduct further review or does not make a decision
before the period of time has expired, the undertakings may implement
the concentration.
Article 26 If the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the
State Council decides to conduct a further review of the concentration, it
shall complete the review and decide whether to prohibit the
concentration of undertakings and issue a written notice to the
undertakings within 90 days from the date of its decision for further
review. If it prohibits the concentration, the relevant reasons shall be
explained. The undertakings may not implement the transaction during
the review period.
Under any of the following circumstances, the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority under the State Council may extend the time limit
stipulated in the previous paragraph by issuing a written notice to the
undertakings, provided that the extension may not exceed 60 days:
(1) the notifying undertakings agree to extend the time limit;
(2) the documents and materials submitted by the undertakings
are inaccurate and need further verification; or
(3) there has been a material change to the circumstances after
the notification by the undertakings.
If the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
does not make a decision before the period of time has expired, the
undertakings may implement the concentration.
Article 27 The following factors shall be considered in the review of
concentrations:
(1) the market shares of the undertakings participating in the
concentration in the relevant market and their ability to
control the market;
(2) the degree of concentration in the relevant market;
(3) the effect of the proposed concentration on market access and
technological progress;
(4) the effect of the proposed concentration on consumers and
other relevant undertakings;
(5) the effect of the proposed concentration on the development
of the national economy; and
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(6) such other factors that the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council deems necessary to
consider for their effects on market competition.
Article 28 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council shall make a decision to prohibit a concentration if the
concentration has the effect of eliminating or restricting competition in
the relevant market. However, if the undertakings can prove that the
concentration's positive effects on competition are obviously greater than
its adverse effects, or is in conformity with societal and public interests,
the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council may
decide not to prohibit such concentration of undertakings.
Article 29 If a concentration of undertakings is not prohibited, the
anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council may
decide to impose restrictive conditions that may reduce the adverse
effects of the concentration on competition.
Article 30 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council shall timely publish to the public decisions to prohibit
concentrations and decisions to add restrictive conditions to concentra-
tions.
Article 31 With respect to mergers and acquisitions of domestic
enterprises or participation by other means in concentrations of
undertakings by foreign capital which impact national security, a national
security review shall be conducted in accordance with relevant
regulations of the State in addition to the concentration of undertakings
review conducted in accordance with this Law.
Chapter V Abuse of Administrative Powers
to Eliminate and Restrict Competition
Article 32 Administrative authorities and organizations authorized
by law and regulation with public affairs administrative functions may
not abuse their administrative powers to require, in any manner or in
disguised form, undertakings or individuals to deal in, purchase or use
only the commodities supplied by any undertakings designated thereby.
Article 33 Administrative authorities and organizations authorized
by law and regulation with public affairs administrative functions may
not abuse their administrative powers by taking the following actions to
impede the free circulation of commodities between regions:
2009]
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(1) imposing discriminatory charges, implementing
discriminatory charging standards or fixing discriminatory
prices on commodities originating in other regions;
(2) imposing technical requirements or inspection standards on
commodities originating in other regions which differ from
those on like local commodities, or adopting such
discriminatory technical measures as repeated inspections or
certifications of commodities originating in other regions, to
restrict the entry of commodities originating in other regions
into the local market;
(3) adopting administrative licenses specifically targeting
commodities originating in other regions to restrict the entry
thereof into the local market;
(4) setting up checkpoints or taking other actions to block the
entry of commodities originating in other regions or the exit
of local commodities; or
(5) such other actions that impede the free circulation of
commodities between regions.
Article 34 Administrative authorities and organizations authorized
by law and regulation with public affairs administrative functions may
not abuse their administrative powers to exclude or restrict the
participation of undertakings from other regions in local tender activities
by prescribing discriminatory qualification requirements or assessment
standards, or by not publishing information in accordance with law.
Article 35 Administrative authorities and organizations authorized
by law and regulation with public affairs administrative functions may
not abuse their administrative powers to exclude or restrict investment or
the establishment of branch offices in their regions by undertakings from
other regions, by adopting measures according treatment unequal to
those on their local undertakings.
Article 36 Administrative authorities and organizations authorized
by law and regulation with public affairs administrative functions may
not abuse their administrative powers to compel undertakings to pursue
monopoly conduct prescribed in this Law.
Article 37 Administrative authorities may not abuse their
administrative powers to formulate provisions containing content which
eliminates or restricts competition.
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Chapter VI Investigation of Suspected Monopoly Conduct
Article 38 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council shall conduct investigations of suspected monopoly conduct.
All undertakings and individuals have the right to report suspected
monopoly conduct to the anti-monopoly enforcement authority. The anti-
monopoly enforcement authority shall maintain the confidentiality of the
tipsters.
The anti-monopoly enforcement authority shall conduct necessary
investigations of suspected monopoly conduct when the reports are in
written form and the relevant facts and evidence have been provided.
Article 39 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority may take the
following measures to investigate suspected monopoly conduct:
(1) entering the business locations or other relevant places of the
undertaking concerned to conduct inspections;
(2) inquiries of the undertaking concerned, interested parties and
other relevant organizations or individuals, and requiring
them to explain the relevant circumstances;
(3) reviewing and copying such relevant documents and
materials of the undertaking concerned and interested parties
or other relevant organizations and individuals as certificates,
agreements, book records, business correspondence and
electronic data;
(4) sealing and holding in custody relevant evidence; and
(5) inquiries on the bank accounts of the undertakings
concerned;
The adoption of the aforementioned measures shall be reported in
writing to and approved by the principal responsible person of the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority and is subject to approval.
Article 40 When the anti-monopoly enforcement authority conducts
an investigation of suspected monopoly conduct, the investigating
officers may not be fewer than two persons and shall present their
identification documents.
The investigating officers, when making inquiries and investiga-
tions, shall make a written record of the investigation to be signed by the
inquiree or the investigatee.
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Article 41 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority and its
personnel shall keep confidential commercial secrets of which they
become aware in the performance of their duties.
Article 42 Undertakings, interested parties and other relevant
organizations and individuals subject to the investigation shall cooperate
with the anti-monopoly enforcement authority in the performance of its
duties in accordance with law, and may not refuse or impede the
investigation by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority.
Article 43 Undertakings and interested parties subject to
investigation have the right to express opinions. The anti-monopoly
enforcement authority shall conduct verification of the facts, rationale
and evidence presented by the undertakings and interested parties subject
to investigation.
Article 44 After the anti-monopoly enforcement authority concludes
its investigation and verification of suspected monopoly conduct and
determines that it constitutes monopoly conduct, it shall make a decision
for disposition in accordance with law and may publish it to the public.
Article 45 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority may suspend
an investigation of suspected monopoly conduct when the undertaking
concerned promises to take specific measures to eliminate the
consequences caused by the monopoly conduct within the period of time
recognized by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority. A decision to
suspend an investigation shall specify the specific commitments of the
undertaking subject to investigation.
When an investigation is suspended, the anti-monopoly
investigation authority shall conduct supervision of the performance of
the commitment by the undertaking. When the undertaking concerned
performs the commitment, the anti-monopoly enforcement authority may
decide to terminate the investigation.
If any of the following occurs, the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority shall resume the investigation:
(1) the undertaking has not performed its commitment;
(2) the facts on which the decision to suspend the investigation
was made have undergone a material change; and
(3) the decision to suspend the investigation was made was based




Chapter VII Legal Liability
Article 46 If undertakings in violation of the relevant provisions of
this Law enter into and perform a monopoly agreement, the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority shall order the undertakings concerned
to cease and desist such act, confiscate the illegal gains, and impose fines
of 1% to 10% of turnover in the preceding year. If the monopoly
agreement has not been implemented, fines of five hundred thousand
yuan or less may be imposed.
If an undertaking voluntarily reports the relevant circumstances of
the monopoly agreement to the anti-monopoly enforcement authority, the
anti-monopoly enforcement authority shall impose reduced punishment
or waive punishment of such undertaking.
If an industry association in violation of the relevant provisions of
this Law organizes undertakings in said industry to enter into a
monopoly agreement, the anti-monopoly enforcement authority may
impose a fine of five hundred thousand yuan or less. If the circumstances
are serious, the social organization registration authority may revoke the
registration thereof in accordance with law.
Article 47 If an undertaking in violation of the relevant provisions
of this Law abuses a dominant market position, the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority shall order the undertaking to cease and desist
such act, confiscate the illegal gains and impose a fine of 1% to 10% of
turnover in the preceding year.
Article 48 If undertakings in violation of the relevant provisions of
this Law implement a concentration, the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council shall order the undertakings concerned
to cease and desist the enforcement of the concentration, dispose of the
shares or assets within a period of time, transfer the business within a
period of time, and take other necessary actions to restore the situation to
the state prior to the concentration, and may impose fines of five hundred
thousand yuan or less.
Article 49 When the anti-monopoly enforcement authority decides
the specific amounts of fines set forth in Articles 46, 47, and 48 hereof, it
shall consider such factors as the nature, degree and duration of the
violations.
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Article 50 If an undertaking engages in monopoly conduct and
causes losses to others, it shall assume civil liability in accordance with
law.
Article 51 If administrative authorities and organizations authorized
by law and regulation with public affairs administrative functions abuse
their administrative powers and engage in conduct that eliminates or
restricts competition, the superior authority thereof shall order correction.
The supervisors directly responsible and other personnel directly
responsible shall be disciplined in accordance with law. The anti-
monopoly enforcement authority may propose a legal disposition to the
relevant superior authority.
If laws and administrative regulations otherwise provide for the
disposition of abuse of administrative power by administrative authorities
and organizations authorized by law and regulation with public affairs
administrative functions which eliminate or restrict competition, the
provisions thereof shall be applied.
Article 52 In case of a refusal to provide relevant materials and
information, or the provision of false materials or information, or the
hiding, destruction or transfer of evidence, or other conduct to refuse or
impede an investigation conducted in accordance with law by the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority, the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority shall order correction, and may impose a fine of twenty
thousand yuan or less on individuals and of two hundred thousand yuan
or less on organizations. If the circumstances are serious, fines of twenty
thousand yuan to one hundred thousand yuan on individuals and of two
hundred thousand yuan to one million yuan on organizations may be
imposed. If a crime is constituted, criminal liability shall be pursued.
Article 53 If a decision by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority
in accordance with Articles 28 and 29 hereof are not accepted, an
administrative appeal may first be filed in accordance with law; if the
administrative appeal decision is not accepted, an administrative suit may
be filed in accordance with law.
If a decision by the anti-monopoly enforcement authority other than
the above are not accepted, an administrative appeal may be filed in
accordance with law or an administrative suit may be filed.
Article 54 If personnel of the anti-monopoly enforcement authority
abuse their powers, neglect their duties, commit malpractice or disclose
trade secrets of which they become aware in the process of enforcement,
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and a crime is constituted, criminal liability shall be pursued in
accordance with law; if a crime is not constituted, disciplinary
punishment shall be imposed in accordance with law.
Chapter VIII Supplementary Provisions
Article 55 This Law is not applicable to the conduct of undertakings
which exercise intellectual property rights in accordance with applicable
intellectual property rights laws and administrative regulations. This Law
is applicable to the conduct of undertakings which abuse intellectual
property rights to eliminate or restrict competition.
Article 56 This Law is not applicable to the cooperative or
coordinative acts by farmers and rural economic organizations in such
business activities as the production, processing, sale, transportation and
storage of produce.
Article 57 This Law takes effect as of August 1, 2008.
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APPENDIX B
(reprinted unedited)
GUIDANCE ON ANTITRUST FILING FOR MERGER AND
ACQUISITION OF DOMESTIC COMPANIES BY
FOREIGN INVESTORS
(Draft for Comments)
In compliance with the Regulation on Merger and Acquisition of
Domestic Companies by Foreign Investors (MOFCOM Circular No. 10,
2006) jointly promulgated by MOFCOM, SASAC, State Tax Bureau,
SAIC and CSRC and State Foreign Exchange Bureau on August 8, 2006,
the M&A deals meeting the thresholds shall be reported to the Treaty and
Law Department of MOFCOM (Antitrust Investigation Office). For
convenience of filing, corresponding guidance is set forth below:
I. Applicant
Normally, applicant in antitrust filing shall be the party who's going
to acquire the other party. However, depending on specific situation of
the case, the applicant could be the party to be acquired as well. The
applicant may make the filing in its own name, or, entrust Chinese law
firm to make the filing by lawyer holding a Chinese bar.
II. Timing of the filing
The filing shall be made after the merger agreement is executed and
before the M&A deals are closed. Where the offer to acquire is
conducted in the securities market, the filing shall be made after the offer
to acquire is published.
III. Material for the notification
The applicant shall submit written material in two sets of hard
copies and one soft copy (CD-ROM preferred). Except the original
attachments of the filing material or otherwise required by this Guidance,
the filing material shall be in Chinese. Where the originals are in foreign
language, they shall be accompanied with the Chinese translation.
The filing material shall include:
1. Application. The application shall be in brief limited to one or two




2. Power of Attorney and Lawyer's Letter. The Power of Attorney
signed by the applicant and the letter issued by the agency where
the entrusted agent services (usually lawyer's letter) shall be
submitted.
3. The identity certification or registration certification of the
applicant. The offshore applicant shall also submit the notarized
and authenticated documents issued by the local notary.
4. The basic information of all parties of the M&A deal. It includes
but not limited to the name of the enterprise; registration address;
business scope; the form of the enterprise (company, partnership or
others); the name, position and contact methods of the contact
person; the revenue of all the M&A parties in the latest fiscal year
(global and in China), the scale of the company, the position of the
company in the industry it pertains to and the history of
establishment and alteration of the company etc.
5. The name list and brief introduction of the affiliates of each M&A
party. The name list shall include but not limited to:
a. All enterprises and individuals directly or indirectly
controlling each M&A party;
b. All enterprises directly or indirectly controlled by each M&A
party;
c. Except the M&A parties, all other enterprises directly or
indirectly controlled by the enterprises and individuals
defined in section a).
The organization chart or tables may be adopted to explain the
affiliation such as the equity structure and the practical control etc.
6. The names of the FilEs established by the M&A parties in China.
7. Brief introduction of M&A transaction. It includes: nature and
approach to transaction (e.g. acquisition of assets, acquisition of
equity, merger, establishing joint venture, etc.), subject matter of
transaction, amount of money of transaction, prospective closing
date of transaction, post-closing controlling relationship among
related companies (chart of corporate controlling structure can be
adopted where necessary), industry or main products involved in
M&A transaction, and motive, goal, or economic justification
analysis of M&A transaction.
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8. Definition of relevant markets. Generally, definition of relevant
markets consists of definition of product markets and definition of
geographic markets. Reasons shall be presented, whether relevant
markets is to be defined or such definition is considered
unnecessary. Where relevant product markets is to be defined,
factors such as substitutability, competition conditions, price, cross
price elasticity of demand, etc. shall be taken into consideration.
Where relevant geographic markets is to be defined, factors such as
nature and characteristics of relevant product or service, barrier to
access, consumer preference, interregional significant difference in
market shares or difference in actual price of enterprise, etc.
9. Sales turnover and market shares of the last two accounting years,
with description of sources of data and basis for calculation.
10. Name and market shares of five largest competitors in relevant
markets, as well as contact information and contact person.
11. Information of supply structure and demand structure in relevant
markets, including a list of major upstream and downstream
enterprises as well as their contact information.
12. Competition situation of relevant markets. Competition situation
includes without limitation following elements:
a. Analysis of market access.
i. Aggregate costs of entry into market under the same
scale of major existing competitors, e.g. including costs
of research and development, setting up distribution
system, promotion, advertisement, services, etc.
ii. Any statutory or factual barriers to access, such as
government permits or government compulsory
standards in any form, etc.
iii. Restrictions arising from patents, know-how, and other
intellectual property rights, as well as restrictions arising
from licensing such rights.
iv. In relevant markets, to what extent the M&A parties are
licensor or licensee of patents, know-how, and other
intellectual property rights.
v. Importance of production of relevant product in large scale.




b. Whether there exists, between operators, horizontal or
vertical cooperation agreements, such as research and
development agreement, agreement on assignment of patent
use right, joint production agreement, specialization
agreement, distribution agreement, long-term supply
agreement, material exchange agreement, etc.
c. Situation of substitution by product import in relevant
markets.
d. Material entry into or exit from markets in the last three
years, including name and contact information of such
enterprises as entering or quitting markets.
13. Merger agreement. If such agreement is in foreign language, a
Chinese translation or Chinese version of important excerpts shall
be submitted at the same time.
14. Audited financial statements of last accounting year of both parties
to M&A. If such statements are in foreign language, a Chinese
translation or Chinese version of important excerpts shall be
submitted at the same time.
15. Situation of review of the same M&A in other countries or
economies.
16. Other issues that needs clarifying to the competent authority.
17. Representations from all parties of this M&A case or from their
entrusted agents on the truth of information filed and/ or on the
accuracy of the information source.
V Term of Review
The M&A review period lasts for thirty (30) working days, beginning
from the day of receiving complete filing materials. Upon the thirty
working days period expires, if no notice of further review is received, the
applicant should be deemed as having passed the review. If such notice is
received, the applicant must further provide the competent authority with
supplementary materials or explain the situation as per the notice, and
accordingly, the review period will be extended subject to specific issues.
V Negotiation before Filing
In order to enhance the efficiency and ensure transparency and
forseeability in the review, the Antitrust Investigation Office encourages
the applicant and its entrusted agent contact unofficially with relevant
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officials in MOFCOM on such matters as to the necessity of filing,
identification of relevant markets, etc. Whether there is any negotiation
before the filing or not, it will not affect the decision of antitrust review.
18. Time Limit and Method of Applying for Negotiation before Filing
The applicant shall apply to the Antitrust Investigation Office for
negotiation one month before the official filing. The Antitrust
Investigation Office will no more accept any application for negotiation
within one week before the official filing. The application for
negotiation before filing shall be delivered in writing to the Antitrust
Investigation Office by fax (Facsimile Number: 65198905).
19. Materials to be Provided by Applicant
The applicant shall submit to the Antitrust Investigation Office
relevant materials, including background information of the transaction,
summary of related industries and relevant market, potential effect
brought by this transaction to market competition, etc. If the applicant
has no doubt whether to do the filing, they can directly provide the draft
of M&A filing as the basis of negotiation and conversation. Questions as
to whether to do the filing shall be brought up in the first phase of the
negotiation. It is recommended by the Antitrust Investigation Office that
the applicant should disclose all the related information which may affect
market competition and submit materials as many as possible.
VI. Confidentiality
In case that the filing parties do not wish to have its filing
information published or revealed, they shall raise confidentiality
requirements while submitting materials, shortly clarifying, on each
document with the need for confidentiality, the reason why they shall not
be published or revealed.
VII. Filing Time and Place
The filing parties shall file with the Antitrust Investigation Office of
MOFCOM during working hours of the MOFCOM. Please send any
materials during 8:30AM to 11:00 AM or 1:30PM to 4:00 PM for
convenience of registration and acceptance in due course.
Address of the Antitrust Investigation Office of MOFCOM: Room
3516, No.2 Dong Chang'an Street, Ministry of Commerce, Beijing.
Antitrust Investigation Office





(reprinted unedited; underlining indicates the track changes
discussed hzia note 249)
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Generally, the filing party shall be the merging/acquiring party; the
filing party may also be the merged/acquired party, based on specific
circumstances of the individual case. Multiple parties who meet the
qualifications of the filing party may choose to file jointly or separately.
The filing party may file the report in its own name, or entrust an
attorney duly admitted to Chinese bar in a Chinese law firm to submit a
filing on its behalf.
II. Time for Filing
The antitrust filing for merger & acquisition ("M&A") shall be
made after the M&A agreement related hereto is signed, and before the
M&A transaction is completed before the plan of the M&A transaction is
announced to general public: filing for extraterritorial M&A shall be
made before the plan of the M&A transaction is announced to general
public or at the same time when such antitrust filing is submitted to the
competent authority of the country where proposed transaction takes
place.. If the transaction is conducted via a tender offer in the securities
market, the antitrust filing shall be made after such tender offer is
announced.
249. Unofficial Translation by Chia-heng Seetoo, B.A. in Economics, National Taiwan
University (2000); M.B.A. in industrial economics, National Central University (2003);
University of Illinois College of Law, J.D. Candidate (degree expected May 2007). This updated
translation is based on the Chinese version published on PRC Ministry of Commerce website, at
http://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/bb/200703/2007030444061 1.html, also referencing to two
different translated versions, courtesy of Peter Wang of Jones Day and Amy Sommers of Squires,
Sanders and Dempsey. I use track-change feature to demonstrate all differences between the
MOFCOM website version and the previously circulated version. Any questions or comments
are welcomed at the following email addresses: cseetoo@gmail.com; cseetoo2@law.uiuc.edu.
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I. Filing Materials
The filing party shall submit the written materials in duplicate, and
in addition shall make available a copy of an electronic version of the
complete set of the written materials (CD-ROM is preferred). Except the
originals of the appendices of the filing materials or otherwise required
by the Guidelines, tThe filing materials shall be in Chinese; any original
documents in foreign languages shall be accompanied by Chinese
translations.
The filing materials shall include the following:
(1) The Filing Letter. The content of the filing letter shall be clear and
concise, and the appropriate length shall be one to two A4-sized
pages. The filing letter shall be signed by the filing party or its
entrusted agent.
(2) Identification or the Registration Certificate of the Filing Party.
When a foreign investor merges or acquires domestic enterprises,
the filing party outside China shall also submit the notarized and
authenticated documents issued by the local notary public: Antitrust
Investigation Office may also require the filing party outside China
in an extra-territorial M&A to submit the notarized and
authenticated documents issued by the local notary public if
necessary.
Power of Attorney and Attorney's Letter. If the filing is made by the
entrusted agent, a Power of Attorney signed by the filing party and
the letter issued by the intermediary institution where the entrusted
agent (usually an Attorney's Letter) is located shall be submitted.
Power of Attorney and Attorney's Letter submitted shall be
originals.
(3) Letter of Authorization and Reference Letter. If the filing is made
by the filing party itself, the filing party shall submit letter of
authorization or identification of the responsible manager. If the
filing is made by the entrusted agent, a Power of Attorney or a letter
of authorization signed by the filing party and a reference letter
issued by the intermediary institution where the entrusted agent is
located shall be submitted. Power of Attorney Letter of
Authorization and/or Reference Letter submitted shall be originals.
Identification or the Registration Certificate of the Filing Party. The
filing party outside China shall also submit the notarized and
authenticated documents issued by the local notary public.
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(4) Basic Information of all Relevant Parties. The recommended scope
of informationis shall include but not limited to: name of the
enterprise, place of registration, scope of business of the enterprise,
form of the enterprise (corporation, partnership, or any other forms
of entity); name, title, and ways of contact of the contact person;
business revenues in the most recent fiscal year of all parties in the
M&A (figures global and in China); scale of the corporation, the
relative position in the industry of the corporation, history of
incorporation and subsequent alterations, etc.
(5) The name list and brief introductions of enterprises affiliated with
each party in the M&A. It is recommended that following factors
to be considered when determining Tthe scope of the name list shall
include but not limited to the following:
(a) All enterprises or individuals who directly or indirectly
control each party in the M&A;
(b) All enterprises that are directly or indirectly controlled by
each party in the M&A;
(c) Any other enterprises that are directly or indirectly controlled
by the enterprises or individuals defined in (a), except the
merging/acquiring party.
(d) Any other related enterprises or individuals.
An organization chart, other charts or illustrations demonstrating
the ownership structures and actual controls among the above
enterprises, etc. are permitted recommended, if necessary.
(6) Names Certificates of Incorporation and Instruments of
Ratification of foreign investing enterprises set up in China by each
party in the M&A, (including foreign investing enterprises and
domestic enterprises invested by such foreign enterprises).
residential representative entities, subsidiaries, and any other entities
registered in the territory of China, ;
(7) Description of the M&A transaction. It is recommended that the
following be , includinged: the characteristics and means of the
transaction (for example, assets acquisitions, stock acquisition,
merger, or joint venture enterprises), subject matter of the
transaction, total amount of the transaction, the process of the M&A
transaction, the estimated completion date of the M&A transaction,
the control relationship among all relevant corporations (using
charts to demonstrate the control structure if necessary), the
industries or major products involved with the M&A transaction;
2009]
TULANE J OF INT'L & COMP LAW
motive, purpose or analysis of economic rationality of the M&A
transaction.
(8) Defining Relevant Markets. Defining relevant markets usually
includes defining product markets and defining geographical
markets. Rationales for defining relevant markets or for such
definition being unnecessary shall be specified. When defining
relevant product markets, factors to be considered shall include,
among other things, substitutability, competition conditions, prices,
cross price-elasticity of demand. When defining relevant
geographical markets, the nature and characteristics of relevant
products or services, barriers to access, favorable treatment
provided to consumers25 °, significant differences in market shares or
real prices of the enterprise in different geographical markets,
among other factors, shall be considered.
(9) In most recent two fiscal years, volume of sales and market share in
relevant markets for each party to the M&A transaction; the source
of data and basis of calculation must also be specified and the
corresponding proof must be submitted accompanied.
(10) Names and market shares of top five competitors in relevant
markets. In order to promote the efficiency of review process, , and
it is encouraged that the market shares or the respective status
within relevant markets, persons of contact and contact methods of
these competitors must be accompanied simutaneously.
(11) Descriptions of the supply structure and demand structure in
relevant markets, which shall include the names and contact
methods of major enterprises in downstream and upstream
industriesindustries in order to promote the efficiency of review
process, it is encouraged that the filing parties also submit the
names and contact methods of major enterprises in downstream and
upstream industries in relevant markets (emphasis added).
(12) Status of competition in relevant markets. We recommend that
Iinformation on status of competition to be provided from the
following perspectivesshall include but not limited to the following:
250. In both Jones Day and Squire Sanders translations, the original language was
translated as "consumer preference." However, the ordinary meaning of "you-hui" means "favor"
or "favorable treatment"; in commercial language it usually means price discounts and
promotional techniques like "buy one get one free." "Consumer preference" translated back to




(a) Market entry analysis, it is recommended that such analysis
made from but not limited to the following perspectives:.
1. The total cost of entering the market; with the same scale of
operation of currently existing major competitors. For
example, costs of research & development"', building a
distribution network, promotion & advertising and services,
etc.
2. Any de jure or de facto barriers of entry;. For example, any
grants of permission from the government or any form of
mandatory standards required by the government.
3. Any entry restrictions caused by patents, proprietary
technology and any other forms of intellectual property
rights,; and any restriction generated during the course of
granting such rights.
4. In relevant markets, the situation ofto what extent is each
party to the M&A being a grantor or grantee of patents,
proprietary technologies or other intellectual property
rights;
5. The importance of the scale of economy in the production
of relevant products;
6. Situation of channels of sources, for example, sources for
raw materialsThe number and scale of competitors in
relevant markets, and whether any de jure or de facto
barriers of entry existed in upstream or downstream
markets.
(b) Whether Situations regarding horizontal or vertical agreements
of cooperation existed between enterprises in relevant markets.
For example, research & development agreements, agreements
on transfer of use rights of patents, joint production
agreements, agreements of specialization, distributorship
agreements, long-term supply agreements and data exchange
agreements, etc. Further details about the above agreements
shall be provided if possible.
(c) The situation of import substitution of products in relevant
markets.
251. The Squire Sanders translation did not translate this term.
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(cd) Any major entries or exits in recent three years, which shall
include the names and contact methods of entering or existing
enterprises.
(13) The M&A Agreement. If the agreement is written in foreign
languages, a Chinese translation or an abstract on substantive terms
in Chinese shall be attached thereto.
(14) Audited financial statements of each party to the M&A transaction
from the previous fiscal year. If such statements are written in
foreign languages, a Chinese translation or an abstract on
substantive terms in Chinese shall be attached thereto
(15) Materials for requesting waiver of antitrust review. If the filing
party believes that the transaction satisfies the criteria with respect
to waiver of review, as stated in the Regulation on Merger and
Acquisition of Domestic Companies by Foreign Investors, shall also
submit materials for requesting such waiver.
(16) Information regarding trade associations in relevant markets. This
includes: whether such associations exist or not, the name of trade
associations, the responsible persons and their methods of contacts
for such associations.
(1715) The status of review filing of this M&A in other countries or
economiesforeign jurisdictions.
(186) Other information required to be furnished to the competent
authority.
(197) Declaration signed by each party to the M&A transaction or its
entrusted agent with respect to the authenticity of the reported
information and/or the reliability of sources of data.
The filing materials shall be organized in a reasonable manner in
order to facilitate the review process. A table of content shall be attached
on top of the filing materials.
If the filing party is unable to furnish certain materials stated above,
or believes that the submission of some above materials is not necessary,
the filing party may raise the issue during pre-filing consultation or
specify the reasons in the filing materials. The filing materials may be




IV Time Limit of the Review Process
The duration of the M&A review is thirty (30) business days,
commencing on the date of the receipt of a complete set of the filing
documents. If the filing party does not receive any further notice upon
the expiration of the 30-day period, the review process shall be deemed
cleared. If the filing party receives aany notice for extension of review
period, then the review process will be extended to the ninetieth (90!)
business day. The filing party must provide any further information or
furnish additional explanations to the competent authority based on the
requirements in the notice; the duration of the review process will then be
extended depending on specific circumstances of the transaction.
V Pre-filing Consultation
In order to improve efficiency, ensure the transparency and
predictability of the review, Antitrust Investigation Office encourages the
filing party and its entrusted agent to initiate informal contact with the
Office before filing, and to conduct consultation with respect to whether
a filing is necessary and definition of relevant markets, among other
things. A request for the pre-filing consultation shall be made as soon as
possible before the formal filing. Such requests shall be faxed to
Antitrust Investigation Office in writing. (FAX: 65198997). Whether
there has been any pre-filing consultation or not does not affect the
conclusion of the antitrust investigation.
In order to promote the efficiency and efficacy of pre-filing
consultation, it is suggested that
(1) The time limit and means of submitting a request for pre-filing
consultation
Applicants of consultation shall submit a request for pre-filing
consultation to the Antitrust Investigation Office one month prior to the
formal filing. Antitrust Investigation Office will not accept any request
for pre-filing consultation one week before the formal filing. Such
request shall be in writing and facsimiled to Antitrust Investigation
Office.
(2) Documents furnished by applicants of consultation
a. Applicants of consultation shall provide relevant documents
to Antitrust Investigation Office, including an introduction to the
background of the M&A transaction, a general description of relevant
industries and relevant markets, and potential impacts the transaction
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may have upon market competition. If the applicant has no doubt about
whether a filing is necessary, the draft of the M&A report can be
provided to serve as the basis of consultation and discussion. Any doubts
about whether a filing is necessary shall be raised during the stage of
consultation. Antitrust Investigation Office recommends that all
applicants of consultation should fully disclose all relevant information
with respect to possible effects on market competition, and should
furnish relevant documents to the fullest extent possible.
VI. Confidentiality
If the filing party does not wish its reported information being
disclosed or publicized, then it shall earmark request confidentiality
when submittingthe documents or content thereof that requires
confidentiality, and briefly state any reasons for not disclosing or
publicizing confidential information. When requesting confidentiality,
the applicant shall also submit a non-confidential version of the filing
materials, documents in need of confidentiality.
VII. [Hours, address omitted]
The purpose of announcing this Guideline is to provide guidance
and assistance to enterprises filing reviews of M&A transactions.
Antitrust Investigation Office may amend this Guideline from time to
time based on the requirements of applicable laws, regulations and other










The rules are provided in accordance with the Anti-monopoly law of the
PR.C (hereinafter called "AMU') for the purpose of clarifying the filling
threshold and procedures and regulating the notification of undertakings.
Article 2 [Threshold for Notifying the Concentration of Undertakings]
A pre-merger notification shall be filed with the Anti-monopoly
Enforcement Authority for Reviewing the Concentration of Undertakings
under the State Council (hereinafter called "the reviewing authority for
concentration of undertakings"), provided a concentration is
characterized by any of the circumstances set forth blow, and the
concentration plan shall not be implemented if it is not notified:
(i) The total global sales revenue (turnover) in the previous year
of all the undertakings involved in the concentration is more
than RMB 12 billion and at least one undertaking in the
concentration has a turnover of more than RMB [ ] million
within the territory of China in the previous year;
(ii) All the undertakings to the concentration have a total
turnover of more than RMB 6 billion within the territory of
China in the previous year.
(iii) One undertaking involved in the concentration has acquired
more than ten undertakings in the relevant industry by the
way of mergeing, obtaining the control, or obtaining the
power to impose influence on decisive within the territory of
China within one year;
(iv) The concentration will lead one undertaking involved in the
transaction to have a market share of not less than 25% of the
market within the territory of China.
At the request of competing undertaking, of relevant authority or of
relevant industrial association, if the reviewing authority for concentra-
tion of undertakings is reasonably of the opinion that the concentration of
undertakings may result in elimination or restriction of competition, it
may nevertheless require the undertakings to file a notification in
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accordance with these rules, even if the criteria set forth in the preceding
paragraph are not met by the concentration of the undertakings.
When calculating the turnover as mentioned in the first paragraph of this
Article, all the turnovers of all the affiliates controlling or controlled by
the undertaking shall be included.
The method of calculating the turnover of the undertakings in the
financial and insurance sectors shall be promulgated by the reviewing
authority of Concentration of Undertaking together with other relevant
department(s) and agency(s) under the State Council.
Article 3 [Adjustment of the notification Threshold]
The reviewing authority of Concentration of Undertaking may adjust the
threshold for notification of understanding stipulated in Article 2(i),
according to elements such as economic development, industry policy
and market competition. The adjustment shall be subject to approval of
the State Council for implementation.
Article 4 [Exemption for Notification]
Concentration of undertakings satisfying Article 22 of the AML may be
exempted from filing the notification with the reviewing authority of
concentration of undertakins.
Pursuant to the relevant law(s), regulation(s), or/and rule(s), if a
concentration of undertakings is subject to approval of concerned
agency(s), such approval is subject to permission of the reviewing
authority of concentration of undertakings before approving the
concentration by relevant authorities. Concentration may be exempted
from of concentration of undertakings notification of concentration after
approval of the review authority of concentration of undertakings.
Article 5 [Filling Obligator]
Option 1: the notification of concentration of undertakings may be either
filed collectively by all the undertakings involved in the transaction as a
whole, or filed by one or several undertakings designated by all the
undertakings involved in the transaction.
Option 2: Any/either undertaking involved in the concentration may file
the notification in case of a merger; in case that a undertaking involved in
the concentration that gets control of the other(s), or gets the decisive




Article 6 [Notification Materials]
To notify for a concentration, undertaking shall submit to the reviewing
authority of concentration of undertakings the materials prescribed in
Article 23 of the AML. In the notification materials, the illustration of
the effects that the concentration of undertakings will impose on the
competition in the relevant market shall include the definition of the
relevant market and the basis for such a definition, the market shares of
the undertakings and the calculating basis, important business activities
of the undertakings in the relevant market, and the economic analysis on
the rationality of the concentration. The concentration agreement can be
a formal contract or just an agreement indicating intents or principles, or
other materials which can prove the intents of the undertakings to the
concentration.
Article 7 [Requirements on the notification Materials]
The notification materials submitted by the undertakings shall be in
Chinese, and must be correct and complete, and shall not conceal
important information or offer false information.
Article 8 [Supplementation and Correction of Materials]
Where the documents or materials submitted by the undertaking are not
complete the reviewing authority of concentration of undertakings shall,
within 3 days since the submission of the receipt of the materials
submitted by the parties, notify the undertaking to submit supplemental
materials in a prescribed period, and with in such period, the undertaking
shall submit the supplemental materials, otherwise it is regarded as not
been notified if the supplemental document was not submitted within the
period.
Where the reviewing authority of the concentration of undertakings
receives the supplemental materials from the undertaking according to
the above paragrah, the preliminary reviewing period shall be calculated
from the day the supplemental materials are received.
Article 9 [Facts Change of the concentration]
If there is substantial change happening to the important fact of the
concentration of the undertakings after the notification of the
concentration of undertakings, the undertakings should inform such
change of fact in time to the reviewing authority of concentration of
undertakings.
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Article 10 [Confidential Information Indications]
Where the undertakings believe that the materials filed include
confidential information, the undertaking shall indicate the same in the
materials, and provide corresponding explanations.
Article 11 [Consultation Prior to the notification]
Before notifying for the concentration, the undertaking may consult with
the reviewing authority of concentration of undertakings for information
related to the notification of the concentration, and the reviewing
authority of concentration of undertakings shall to facilitate the
consultation process for the undertakings.
Article 12 [Fast Regime for Preliminary Review]
The reviewing authority of concentration of undertakings shall process
the review with efficiency, and shall give the notifying undertaking or
interested parties chances to make statements, facilitate the information
communication with the notifying undertaking and interested parties.
In the preliminary review, for a concentration obviously not characterized
by competition restriction or competition elimination, the reviewing
authority of concentration of undertaking shall make a timely decision
that there shall be no further review process to be taken, and shall, in a
proper method, immediately notify the notifying undertaking of such a
decision before the formal written notification is made to the
undertakings.
Article 13 [Secret Keeping Obligations]
Officials of the reviewing authority of the concentration of undertakings
are obligated to keep the following information confidential: the business
secrets obtained in the consultation before the notification and that
obtained in the materials provided by the undertaking, and information
referred to as secret information explicitly by the undertaking.
Article 14 [Further Process of Review]
Where the reviewing authority of the concentration of undertakings
decides to make further process of review, to the notifying undertaking




Article 15 (Legal Liabilities for Failure of Notification of Concentration
and for False Information)
Undertakings failing to notify a concentration where the notification is
necessary, or holding back important information or submitting false
information in the notification, shall be punished respectively according
to Article 48 and 52 of the AML.
Article 16 (Legal Liabilities for Officials)
Officials of the reviewing authority of the concentration of undertakings
abusing their power, neglecting their duties, practicing graft, or
disclosing business secrets or confidential information obtained, if it is
constituting a criminal offence, shall be pursued for criminal liabilities in
accordance with the law. If the wrongdoing is not to the- degree of
constituting a criminal offence, administrative sanction shall be imposed
in accordance with the law.
Article 17 (Drafting of the Detailed Guidelines)
As needed, the reviewing authority of the concentration of undertakings
may make detailed guidelines on the notification in accordance with the
AML and the Rules.
Article 18 (Effective Date)
These Rules shall come into effect as of August 1, 2008.
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APPENDIX E
(reprinted unedited)
NOTICE CONCERNING THE SOLICITATION OF PUBLIC
OPINIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE COUNCIL
REGULATIONS ON NOTIFICATION OF
CONCENTRATIONS OF UNDERTAKINGS
(Wilmer Hale, trans.)
Issued by the Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council
In order to further improve the transparency of legislation and raise
the quality of legislation, the Legislative Affairs Office of the State
Council ("LAO") now publishes the State Council Regulations on
Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings (draft for solicitation of
opinions) and solicits opinions from all sectors of society. The relevant
issues are notified as follows:
Main contents of the Draft for which opinions are solicited
The contents of the draft for solicitation of opinions mainly
provided in three respects:
1. Clarification of meanings of relevant concepts regarding
concentrations of undertakings.
The Anti-Monopoly Law does not prescribe meanings with respect
to "obtaining control of another undertaking" and "the capability to
exercise determinative influence over another undertaking" in
concentrations of undertakings. In order to enhance the practicality of
relevant regulations, the draft expressly provides four particular
circumstances under "obtaining control of another undertaking", and
clarifies that "the capability to exercise determinative influence over
another undertaking" means "to exercise determinative influence over the
decision-making of production and operating policies of another
undertaking". (Article 2)
2. Clarification of standards for notifications of concentrations of
undertakings and their adjustment mechanism.
The draft provides three notification standards for concentrations of
undertakings, where concentrations of undertakings which reach any of
the following three items shall file prior notifications with the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council (Article 3).
These three standards are:
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(1) global sales revenue during the previous fiscal year of all
undertakings participating in the concentration exceeds Rmb 9
billion, and at least two of such undertakings' sales revenue in
China during the previous fiscal year exceeds Rmb 300 million;
(2) sales revenue in China during the previous fiscal year of all
undertakings participating in the concentration exceeds Rmb
1.7 billion, and at least two of such undertakings' sales
revenue in China during the previous fiscal year exceeds
Rmb 300 million;
(3) the concentration will result in an undertaking participating
in the concentration occupying a greater than 25% share in
the relevant market in China.
The above three notification standards provided in the draft for the
solicitation of opinions shall uniformly govern concentrations of
undertakings in all industries and sectors. Among of them, the first two
standards use sales revenue of undertakings as parameters to make
notification standards as objective and clear as possible, and easy for
undertakings to understand and grasp with a clear behavioral
expectation. The first standard takes into account sales revenue both
globally and in China, the second standard only takes into account sales
revenue in China. The third standard takes into account market share as a
parameter, which supplements the first two standards. The numbers
provided in the notification standards were proposed by experts from the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in their monograph study report,
which was calculated by building an economic model based on
comprehensive research of notification standards for concentrations of
undertakings in 48 countries and in accordance with China's per capita
GDP in 2007 as well as consideration of other factors.
Because the notification standards for concentrations must be
adapted to social and economic development level, market competition
circumstances, industrial policy and anti-monopoly enforcement
experience, and reflect fluctuations in price indices, all countries
generally make adjustments with respect to notification standards for
concentration of undertakings from time to time. The draft provides
adjustment mechanisms with respect to notification standards for
concentration of undertakings, i.e., the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council may propose amendments to
notification standards in accordance with actual conditions; such
amendments become effective after approval by the State Council
(Article 5).
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3. [The draft provides] other issues relevant to notification of
concentrations of undertakings.
(1) Clarification of the persons responsible for notification of
concentration of undertakings. The draft for solicitation of
opinions provides the persons responsible for notification of
concentrations of undertakings in varying circumstances, i.e.,
for merger undertakings, the undertakings participating in the
merger shall jointly file the notification with the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council; for
any undertaking obtaining control of another undertaking
through the acquisition of equity interests or assets or by
contract, the undertaking obtaining control rights shall file
the notification with the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council (Article 7).
(2) Clarification of the prior consultation mechanism. The draft
for solicitation of opinions provides that undertakings may
consult with the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under
the State Council with respect to any issue in connection with
a notification prior to filing, and the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority under the State Council shall provide
necessary guidance to the undertakings (Article 8).
(3) Clarification of the requirements for documents and
materials to be submitted in a notification. First, undertakings
shall submit truthful and complete documents and materials,
and must not submit any false information or omit any
significant information; second, all documents and materials
must be submitted in Chinese (Article 10).
(4) Expressly provide that notice shall be given for material
changes. The draft for solicitation of opinions provides: if any
material change occurs with respect to important facts of the
concentration of undertakings after a notification has been
filed, the undertakings shall timely inform the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority under the State Council of the relevant
circumstances (Article 12).
(5) Provide requirements for confidential information. The draft
for solicitation of opinions provides: undertakings may
request the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the
State Council to maintain all submitted doctaments and
materials in confidence if they believe that any disclosure of
such documents and materials may result in a material
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adverse impact; the anti-monopoly enforcement authority
under the State Council shall keep documents and materials
submitted by the undertakings in confidence if it deems the
undertakings' application for confidentiality is reasonable;
the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council and its personnel shall have the obligation of
maintaining the confidentiality of trade secrets and other
information for which confidentiality is required; the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
shall internally set up a strict confidentiality system (Article 13).
(6) Provide an expedited initial review mechanism. Observing
actual practice in various countries, the overwhelming
majority of notifications of concentrations of undertakings do
not require further review. In order to reduce the obligations
of the parties concerned, the draft for solicitation of opinions
provides an expedited initial review mechanism, i.e., the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
shall determine as early as possible not to conduct a further
review with respect to any notification of a concentration
which obviously will not result in the effect of eliminating or
restricting competition, and timely inform the undertakings
in writing (Article 14).
Other relevant issues
Relevant units and persons from all sectors of society may summit
opinions for revisions with respect to the draft for the solicitation of
opinions by April 12, 2008 by the following means:
I1. log on to the PRC Government Legislative Information
Website at: http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn, present your opinions
with respect to the Draft through the Administrative
Legislation Draft for Solicitation of Opinions Management
Information System displayed on the left side of the
2. mail a letter containing your opinions to: Legislative Affairs
Office of the State Council, P.O. Box 1750, Beijing 100017,
and please mark "solicitation of opinions for provisions on
notification of concentrations of undertakings" on the outside
of the envelope.
3. By email to jzsb~chinalw.gov.cn.
Please submit your opinions by April 12, 2008.
March 27, 2008
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State Council Regulations on Notification of
Concentrations of Undertakings
(Draft for Solicitation of Opinions)
Article 1 In order to clarify norms and procedures for the notification of
concentrations of undertakings and standardize notifications of
concentrations of undertakings, these Regulations are formulated in
accordance with the Law of the People's Republic of China (the "Anti-
Monopoly Law").
Article 2 Concentrations of undertakings refer to the following
circumstances:
(1) mergers of undertakings;
(2) obtaining control of interests or assets;
(3) obtaining control of or the capability to exercise d
Obtaining control of another undertaking as referred to in the
previous paragraph shainclude obtaining 50% or more of the equity
interests or assets with voting rights of another undertaking, or becoming
the owner of the largest portion of equity interests or assets with voting
rights, or majority voting rights which may actually dominate
anothundertaking or determine the election of half or more of the
members of the board of directors of another undertaking, as well as
other circumstances as determined by the influence over another
undertaking shall mean the exercise of determinative influence over the
decision-making of production and operating policies of another
undertaking.
Article 3 Undertakings shall file a prior notification with the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council for
concentrations which reach any of the following standards, and no
concentration may be implemented without notification:
(1) global sales revenue during the previous fiscal year of all
undertakings participating in the concentration exceeds Rmb
9 billion, and at least two of such undertakings' sales revenue
in China during the previous fiscal year exceeds Rmb 300
million;
(2) sales revenue in China during the previous fiscal year of all
undertakings participating in the concentration exceeds Rmb
1.7 billion, and at least two of such undertakings' sales




(3) the concentration will result in an undertaking participating
in the concentration occupying a greater than 25% share in
the relevant market in China.
With respect to the calculation of sales revenue, the characterization
and actual conditions of different industries and geographies must be
taken into account. Detailed rules shall be formulated by the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority with consultation with other relevant
authorities and departments under the State Council.
Article 4 For those concentrations of undertakings which do not reach
any of the standards prescribed under Article 3 but which the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council deems may
have the effect of eliminating or limiting competition in the relevant
market, the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
may require such undertakings to file a notification in accordance with
these Regulations.
Article 5 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council may propose amendments to notification standards in
accordance with actual conditions; such amendments shall become
effective after approval by the Sate Council.
Article 6 Undertakings need not file notifications with the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council under any of
the following circumstances:
(1) one of the undertakings participating in the concentration
holds 50% or more of the voting rights of the equity interests
or assets of the other undertakings;
(2) 50% or more of the equity interests or assets with voting
rights of each undertaking participating in the concentration
are held by the same undertaking which is not participating in
the concentration.
Article 7 For mergers of undertakings, the undertakings participating in
the merger shall jointly file the notification with the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority under the State Council.
For any undertaking obtaining control of another undertaking
through the acquisition of equity interests or assets, the undertaking
obtaining control rights shall file the notification with the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority under the State Council.
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For any undertaking obtaining control of or the capability to
exercise determinative influence over another undertaking by contract or
other means, the undertaking obtaining control of or capability to
exercise determinative influence over another undertaking shall file the
notification with the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the
State Council.
Article 8 Undertakings may consult with the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority under the State Council with respect to any issue
in connection with the notification prior to filing, and the anti-monopoly
enforcement authority shall provide relevant guidance to the
undertakings.
Article 9 Undertakings which file a notification of a concentration with
the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council shall
submit the following documents and materials:
(1) application;
(2) explanation of the concentration's impact on conditions of
competition in the relevant market;
(3) concentration agreement;
(4) financial and accounting reports of the undertakings
participating in the concentration for the previous fiscal year,
audited by a certified public accountant;
(5) such other documents and materials as required by the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council.
The application shall provide the names, domiciles, and scope of
business of the undertakings participating in the concentration as well as
the date of the concentration and such other matters as prescribed by the
anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council.
Article 10 Undertakings shall submit truthful and complete documents
and materials, and may not submit any false information or omit any
significant information. All documents and materials shall be submitted
in Chinese.
Article 11 If the documents and materials submitted in the notification
by the undertakings are incomplete, the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council shall timely inform the undertakings of
any documents and materials required to be supplemented, as well as the
time limit for submitting the supplement. A notification shall be deemed
as having never been filed if the documents and materials are not
supplemented within the prescribed period.
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For supplemental materials and documents submitted by the
undertakings in accordance with the previous paragraph, the time limit
for an initial review conducted by the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council provided under Article 25(2) of the
Anti-Monopoly Law shall be calculated from the date of receipt of all
documents and materials
Article 12 If any material change occurs with respect to important facts
of the concentration of undertakings after a notification has been filed,
the undertakings shall timely inform the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council of the relevant circumstances.
If circumstances as provided in the previous paragraph have
occurred, the time limit for an initial review conducted by the anti-
monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council shall be
calculated from the date of receipt by the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council of all materials evidencing the change
of facts.
Article 13 Undertakings may request the anti-monopoly enforcement
authority under the State Council to maintain all submitted documents
and materials in confidence if they believe that any disclosure of such
documents and materials may result in a material adverse impact.
The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
shall keep documents and materials submitted by the undertakings in
confidence if it deems the undertakings' application for confidentiality to
be reasonable, and may require such undertakings to submit a non-
confidential summary of the documents and materials.
The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
and its personnel shall have the obligation of maintaining confidentiality
with respect to trade secrets known from consultations prior to filing and
in documents and materials submitted by the undertakings and
information for which the undertakings expressly require confidentiality.
The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State Council
shall internally set up a strict confidentiality system.
Article 14 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council shall set up an expedited initial review mechanism, and
determine as early as possible not to conduct a further review with
respect to any notification of a concentration which obviously will not
result in the effect of eliminating or restricting competition, and timely
inform the undertakings in writing.
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Article 15 If the anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council makes a decision to further review the concentration, it shall
conduct such further review in accordance with relevant provisions of the
Anti-Monopoly Law.
Article 16 If any undertaking conducts a concentration of undertakings
but fails to file a notification of such as required under these Provisions,
penalties shall be imposed in accordance with Article 48 of the Anti-
Monopoly Law
Article 17 If the staff of the Anti-Monopoly Enforcement Authority
under the State Council abuse their powers, neglect their duties, commit
misdeeds or disclose trade secrets or confidential information which
constitutes a crime, criminal liability shall be duly pursued; if a crime is
not constituted, disciplinary action shall be duly taken.
Article 18 The anti-monopoly enforcement authority under the State
Council may propose detailed guidelines for the notification of
concentrations of undertakings, which shall be formulated and
promulgated by the anti-monopoly commission of the State Council.
Article 19 These Regulations shall enter into force as of August 1, 2008.
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